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Lurching Towards the Millennium:
The Law School, the Research University,
and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education
PHILIP C. KISSAM*
This Article analyzes and draws lessons from the intersections of four
complex institutions: the American law school, the American research university,
the legal profession, and the major professional reforms of legal education-
clinics, law school writing programs and ethics training. The thesis of this
Article is that several institutional failures are limiting the beneficial effects of
the professional reforms and, to help develop the promise and principles of these
reforms, various writing exercises should be incorporated throughout the
traditional law school curriculum. This Article also argues that these writing
exercises could be implemented at minimal costs to law schools and to the
professors who teach in the core curriculum.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the twentieth century ends American law schools and American
universities are experiencing confusion. These institutions are successful in many
ways, but at this fin-de-siecle there are centrifugal forces, including many
conflicting forces, which appear to be pulling these institutions apart, shifing or
diminishing their collective purposes and perhaps their effectiveness-especially
in teaching undergraduates and law students. 1 In law schools, for instance, there is
much uncertainty and conflict about what constitutes good teaching,2 what
constitutes good scholarship,3 and what the basic missions of law schools are or
should be.4
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. My thanks to Jody Lamb for her helpful
research and to John Elson, Laura Hines, Dick Markovits, Carol McCrehan Parker, and Peter
Schanck for their helpful comments on drafts. This work was supported in part by the
Postlethwaite Fund of the University of Kansas School of Law.
1 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 109-270 (1993) (discussing law schools); see generally BILL READINGS, THE
UNIvERsrrY IN RUINs (1996).
2 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 109-270; David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students
Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 503-06 (1984); Richard S. Markovits, The
Professional Assessment of Legal Academics: On the Sh if from Evaluator Judgment to Market
Evaluations, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417,418-23 (1998).
3 See, e.g., ARTHUR AusT'N, THE EMPIRE STRIcES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE
OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 156-78 (1998); John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship
or, Ifthe Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDuC. 343, 356-75
(1989); Markovits, supra note 2, at 423-26.
4 Compare, eg., SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, 1-215
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Within this turmoil, the American Bar Association and particular
constituencies and individuals within law schools continue to support three
professional reforms to legal education: clinical education, training in legal ethics
or legal professionalism, and legal writing courses.5 These reform movements
themselves are in some turmoil and constitute significant centrifugal forces. In
certain senses, these reforms are oppositional to traditions and principles of the
case method/final examination law school, and the university law school has
tended to oppose, limit, compromise, and assimilate the reforms. This opposition
and assimilation have constrained the professional reforms, diverted them at times
from their ideal principles, and limited significantly their beneficial effects. Yet
the educational principles of these reforms offer a promising way to improve all
legal education-if these principles could be perceived as a coherent program and
then translated for effective use in core law school courses.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate how the principles of the
professional reforms could be employed to shift mainstream law teaching towards
more effective and more democratic forms of education. Such changes seem
possible if three conditions can be satisfied. First, we must comprehend certain
transformations of the American research university and the legal profession that
are affecting contemporary legal education. This understanding is necessary to
appreciate the ill value of the concepts or principles of the professional reforms
and the full depth of the resistance to these principles. Second, we must
comprehend the subtle, substantial, and often tacit resistance to the reforms and
their principles that is maintained by the traditions or structures of the case
method/final examination law school. This resistance not only makes it difficult
to advance reform ideas but has distorted, even corrupted, the practices and
principles of the professional reforms. The ideal principles need to be extracted or
rescued from the actual practices of the reforms. Third, we must figure out ways
to translate the basic principles of the reforms so they can be employed effectively
(1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT] with John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of
Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDuC. 157, 157-97
(1993).
5 The American Bar Association has promoted these reforms through periodic task force
studies of legal education and by altering its accreditation standards for law schools. See, e.g.,
ABA, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(ii) (1996) ("The law
school shall offer.., an educational program designed to provide its graduates with basic
competence in legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral and
written communication."); MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 330-34 (recommending that
law schools expand their training of prospective lawyers to promote the acquisition of a
relatively broad range of "professional skills and values'). On the present nature and status of
law school clinics, see generally Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508 (1992) [hereinafter In-House Clinic Report]; on ethics training, see, for
example, Deborah Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 38-50
(1992); on legal writing courses, see generally J. Christopher Rideout & Jill . Ramsfield, Legal
Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994).
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and economically within traditional law courses. Significant change will be
possible only if the reform principles can be implemented by mainstream teachers
at little or no cost to themselves or, better yet, with benefits to them as well as to
students.
Part II of this Article describes recent transformations of the research
university and legal profession that are affecting legal education. This analysis
reveals the modem university to be a "university in ruins,"'6 which subtly if
paradoxically imposes adverse effects on law schools while creating conditions
favorable for innovation. This analysis also reveals an ever more complex and
diversified legal profession that is placing increasing but contradictory demands
upon law schools. These transformations of the university and profession have
established what might be called "productive dilemmas" for law schools-
dilemmas which threaten negative effects but also offer considerable room and
promise for establishing richer forms of legal education.
Part I of this Article explores the practices of the three professional reforms
in order to discover possible ways out of the dilemmas. The point of this analysis
is not to promote the reforms themselves, although this would not be a bad idea,
but rather to recover the educational principles or purposes of the reforms from an
obscurity created by the deep and often tacit assumptions of the case method/final
examination law school. The basic principles of the reforms are those of acquiring
tacit professional knowledge (that is, knowledge of things we know but cannot
speak, like knowledge of how to hit good backhand shots) through much practice,
individualized supervision, and feedback, contemplating ethical values in law and
lawyering; making sound practical judgments; and learning by writing. If these
principles can be related to each other effectively and translated into useful forms
for economical use in mainstream courses, they could form the basis for a much
richer and more effective legal education.
Part IV then presents a sketch of what legal education might look sketch
depicts a "quasi-clinical curriculum" that would de-center the law school's
reliance on the case method and on final examinations to teach doctrinal subjects.
To implement the reform principles, various "writing-across-the-curriculum"
practices would be inserted into doctrinal courses in ways that are economical to
both law schools and law professors. 7 These practices might take many forms
6 This idea is the title and thesis of Bill Readings. See generally READINGS, supra note 1.
7 A "writing-across-the-curriculum" movement developed in American universities during
the past two decades, promoted mostly by English departments as a means of improving the
abilities of contemporary college students to think, analyze, and write. Cf Leigh Hunt
Greenshaw, "To Say What the Law Is ": Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L.
REV. 861, 882-95 (1995) (stating that writing practices in doctrinal courses can improve the
teaching of legal rhetoric); Peter W. Gross, On Law School Training in Analytic Skill, 25 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 261,285-91 (1973) (stating that writing tasks should be given more emphasis in
order to teach legal analysis effectively); see generally WRrnNG ACROSS THE CURRICULUM,
CURRENT ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Barbara Leigh Smith ed., No. 3 1983-1984); Carol
McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to
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which could range, for example, from short writings or brief outlines that help
students prepare for examinations; 8 to short writings (written either in or outside
class) that help students analyze, interpret, synthesize, or apply judicial opinions;9
to drafts of pleadings, contracts, or legislative documents that supplement case
method studies;' 0 to writing on contested issues of legal ethics; to writing longer
research papers, briefs, or memorandums that replace final examinations.'l Not
all these writings need be reviewed by professors and many could be reviewed by
teaching assistants, other students, or the writers themselves working under a
professor's general direction. These sorts of writings could improve the learning
of law students across a rather wide range of subjects and skills by providing an
active focused practice that emphasizes understanding and applying legal
doctrine, making sound rhetorical and other practical judgments, contemplating
the ethics of law, and-significantly--utilizing individualized supervision and
feedback. This writing could also improve the general reading and writing habits
of lawyers by encouraging more critical and more imaginative reading and
writing of legal texts.12 The proliferation of writing would also help make legal
education more democratic-by providing more attention to individual students
and by helping to accommodate the diverse learning styles, perspectives,
backgrounds, and talents of contemporary law students.
I. BASIC TRANSFORMATIONS
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the modern law school
was constructed on the basis of two foundational institutions: the newly
developed American research university and the then current practices for training
lawyers. For example, the idea of employing full-time professors to become
experts in "legal science" and the training of lawyers as scientists was drawn from
the research university and amalgamated with professional practices for training
apprentices such as the reading of cases and making arguments in "moots" or
Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REv. 561 (1997).
8 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Marc Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in
Legal Education, 35 1. LEGAL EDUc. 528, 542-43 (1985); Parker, supra note 7, at 568-79.
9 See, e.g., John M. Burman, Out-of-Class Assignments as a Method of Teaching and
Evaluating Law Students, 42 1 LEGAL EDuc. 447, 456-57 (1992); Greenshaw, supra note 7, at
882-85.
10 See, e.g., Kathlean S. Bean, Writing Assignments in Law School Classes, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 276,279-85 (1987); Parker, supra note 7, at 580-89.
11 See generally, Philip C. Kissam, Teaching Constitutional Law Differently, 9 CONST.
COMMENT 237 (1992).
12 See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking
Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 163-70 (1993); Philip C. Kissam, Thinking (By
Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REV. 135,140 (1987).
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moot court. 13 Although the ideas about legal science and legal scientists were
quickly abandoned or modified, the distinctive "case method," which applies a
kind of reasoning to judicial opinions, has ever since remained the dominant
method of law teaching and the prevalent method of legal scholarship. 14 The
research university also provided the practice of written examinations, which law
schools have adapted and modified into a distinctive system of comprehensive
final examinations that are graded in ways that can easily generate discrete
rankings of all law students.15
The historical relationships between law schools and these foundational
institutions have produced deep, often tacit assumptions about the nature of
appropriate education in the university law school. Generally speaking, university
education has been assumed to be "theoretical" or "about reason," and
professional legal training in the university has been assumed to be about
acquiring "theoretical knowledge" about law, leaving only limited room at best
for acquiring "practical knowledge."'16 The case method that dominates law
school texts, law teaching, and legal scholarship rests on these assumptions about
theory and reason, and the use of the case method to generate and teach doctrinal
knowledge and the skills of doctrinal analysis is rarely questioned. Moreover,
when the case method is questioned, the usual response is that the method at most
needs only to be supplemented by other practices. 17 Law school examinations are
similarly assumed to be appropriate, if not the best way to measure the
competence of students, seemingly because these examinations implicate
analytical skills and reasoning that are part of the case method's "theoretical
knowledge" about law.18 The case method/final examination law school also rests
upon the assumption that university graduates who enter law schools will have
attitudes, experiences, and skills in reading, thinking, and writing that the case
method/final examination system can shape or reform into the critical reading,
thinking and writing skills of good lawyers.
But the foundational institutions upon which the modem law school was built
13 See WLuAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION 7-28, 92-99, 148-64 (1994); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, 35-199 (1983); ARTHUR E.
SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 73
(1967).
14 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Plus Ca Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945, 1945-46 (1993); see
generally Edmund M. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379 (1952) (describing the
case method).
15 See Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433, 437-52
(1989).
16 See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical
Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577,578 (1987).
17 See, e.g., MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 330-34.
18 See Kissam, supra note 15, at 440-44.
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have been subject to substantial transformations in recent decades. The American
university no longer focuses as much upon theory or reason, especially in training
undergraduates, and the legal profession is no longer as centered upon the use of
appellate court opinions as it was in the late nineteenth century. If these
foundational institutions have changed, the assumptions of the university law
school may no longer be valid and should be put into question or rethought. We
thus should examine the transformations of the research university and legal
profession to assess how well the assumptions of the case method/final
examination law school serve legal education.
A. The Research University
The American research university in which most law schools are located was
established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a site of
"reason" and "culture." "Reason" was to be applied by different academic
disciplines to contest tradition and advance knowledge in the enlightenment sense
of Immanuel Kant, and "culture" was to be pursued in a dual sense prescribed by
ideals of the nineteenth century German university: As the expansion and
preservation of knowledge and as the cultivation of minds. The Kantian notion of
reason meant that research and education should be oriented towards "theoretical"
rather than "practical" knowledge, and such reason together with the dual sense of
culture meant that university professors should engage in both research and
scholarship (to expand culture) and teaching (to cultivate minds).19
The modem American law school was grounded in these ideas of reason and
culture. In the late nineteenth century, the Dean of Harvard, Christopher
Columbus Langdell, promoted casebooks and the case method of studying
appellate court opinions as means of applying reason to legal materials. He
advocated hiring full-time professors who did not have or need substantial
practice experience but who would instead be capable of expanding legal
knowledge and teaching students through skillful applications of the case method.
He promoted final examinations to force students to take their university legal
studies seriously.20 Meanwhile, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued that the law
school's mission was to provide "moral education" to an "army of specialists"
capable of employing technical legal concepts to restrain "democratic
excesses."
21
These basic ideas of reason and culture still reverberate throughout the legal
academy. Law professors, like other university professors, are expected to devote
substantial time to both research and teaching. The education of lawyers remains
19 See READINGs, supra note 1, at 54-88.
20 See, e.g., LAPIANA, supra note 13, 7-28, 55-58; STEVNs, supra note 13, at 52-54; see
generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Use of Law Schools, in THE EssENTIAL HOLMEs 224-
28 (Richard Posner ed. 1992).
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essentially a function of the case method and final examinations, especially in the
first two years of law school.22 The case method and its suasive, if open-ended,
distinction between "law" and "politics" (or "rules" and "policies") keep law
students focused on technical concepts and relatively indifferent to questions of
practice with real clients or questions of social justice2 3 Despite the many kinds
of new scholarship, the vast bulk of writing by law professors and students
remains committed to using the case method in order to analyze, organize, and
criticize judicial doctrine.24 More subtly, "reason" and "theory" continue to be
privileged terms in law school discourse and politics,25 a privileging that supports
the resistance of law schools to treating the new professional reforms as anything
more than mere supplements to the case method/final examination system.2 6
Yet, at the end of the twentieth century, while reason and culture have not
departed from the university, our contemporary universities have been
transformed in ways that are subtly affecting law schools and are putting into
question assumptions about how legal education should be conducted. Most
obviously, during the past four decades American universities have expanded
dramatically in number and size, more than tripling their total enrollment.27 This
expansion supported a concomitant expansion of law schools in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s,28 and has produced contemporary law students who have more
diverse educational backgrounds, talents, and quite probably more diverse
interests than students who traditionally attended law schools. The marked
entrance of women and members of racial minority groups into law schools
during this period exemplifies, but does not exhaust, the very substantial
demographic changes in law schools that have been wrought by the modem
expansion of American universities.
Simultaneously the American research university has experienced a profound
22 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 14, at 1948. But cf. Jay Feinman, The Future History of
Legal Education, 29 RuTGERs LJ. 475, 477-83 (1998) (predicting that the future historians of
legal education will perceive the 1980s as a time when more diverse law schools emerged).
2 3 See, e.g., ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT
HARvARD AND BEYOND 51-93 (1992); John Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education; The
Potential for Implementing the MacCrate Report's Recommendations for Curricular Reform, I
CLIN. L. REV. 363,383-86 (1994); Duncan Kennedy, LegalEducation and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591,596-600 (1982).
24 See Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and
Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart,
30 SuFFoLKL. REV. 353,370-71 (1996).
25 See Spiegel, supra note 16, at 580-95.
26 See infra Part HI.
27 See, e.g., Alan Ryan, Invasion of the Mind Snatchers, NY REv. BooKs, Feb. 11, 1993,
at 13, 13.
28 See SECION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, A REVIEW OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNTrED STATES 40 (1972); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, ABA, A REVIW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (1994).
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structural transformation in which increasing attention and resources have been
devoted by the university to faculty research, scholarship, and training of graduate
students, while undergraduate education has been left to survive as something of a
poor cousin.29 This transformation appears to be changing the nature of
undergraduate education, producing larger classes, more lectures, more courses
featuring critical reading and writing taught by graduate students, more
impersonality, more competition, and more indifference among students to the
substance of their studies if not their grades.30 These changes suggest that many
law students may begin their legal education with rather limited motivations,
aptitudes, or experiences in several intellectual activities that are preconditions for
successful learning in the case method/final examination system. These activities
include: the careful, critical, imaginative reading of complicated texts, the
contemplation of ethical questions-as presented by literature, philosophy, or the
social sciences-and the writing coherent texts on complex subjects in ways that
depend on a process of rereading both the text one is writing and one's subject
texts; obtaining feedback from these rereadings; and relentlessly rethinking,
revising, and rewriting texts. 31 Might not the increased competition for grades
29 On the structural transformation of American research universities since the 1950s, see
generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM & NANCY DIAMoND, THE RISE OF AMERICAN RESEARCH
UNIVERSrrIES: ELITES AND CHALLENGERS IN THE POSTWAR ERA (1997); THE RESEARCH
UNrVERsrrY IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (Jonathan R. Cole et al. eds., 1994). On the declining
status and imbalance of undergraduate education vis-4-vis research and graduate education
within the contemporary research university, see Jonathan R. Cole, Balancing Acts: Dilemmas
of Choice Facing Research Universities, in THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY IN A TIME OF
DISCONTENT, supra, at 4, 23-28; see generally ERNEST L. BOYER, COLLEGE: THE
UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1987); ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP
RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE (1990); BOYER COMM'N ON EDUCATING
UNDERGRADUATES IN THE RESEARCH UNIv., RENVETw G UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION: A
BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICA'S RESEARCH UNIvERSmEs (1998).
3 0 See generally GEORGE H. DOUGLAS, EDUCATION WITHOUT IMPACr: How OUR
UNIvERmEs FAIL THE YOUNG (1992); CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, CRISIS IN THE ACADEMy:
RETHINKING HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1996). These changes in undergraduate
education are not likely to be the same at all institutions, of course, because elite research
universities and elite liberal arts colleges have the resources to provide continuing attention to
undergraduates. Yet there are complaints today about the limited teaching efforts of research-
oriented professors and the increasing competitiveness of students about grades. See Julie
Flaherty, On Campus, NY TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at B9 (discussing competitiveness at Harvard,
an elite research university); William H. Honan, Small LiberalArts Colleges Facing Questions
on Focus, NY TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at B8 (describing competitiveness at elite liberal arts
colleges noting that "[t]he claim [that faculty members at small colleges devote themselves to
being teachers and mentors] is only partly valid, since small-college professors, like those at
universities, are well aware that throughout academe, professional advancement is largely based
on research and publishing and therefore are ignored at one's peril").
31 Cf. Fajans & Falk supra note 12, at 163-70 (describing the limited critical reading
abilities observed among upper class students in an advanced legal research and writing
course); Parker, supra note 7, at 565-66 (describing how the writing process generates
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among undergraduates who attend law schools also influence their law school
behavior, causing them to seek competition rather than understanding in law
school classrooms,32 to focus on examination-related material and ignore matters
not covered on final examinations,33 or to simply forego class attendance
altogether in order to prepare for their examinations? 34 Might not the changes in
undergraduate education also portend a limited intellectual interest or curiosity
among at least a significant portion of law students that could reduce their
engagement with a range of difficult but important subjects such as legal ethics,
legal theory, and the open-ended, rather frustrating process of constructing legal
arguments in hard cases? 35
The case method/final examination system assumes that university-trained
undergraduates will have sufficient aptitude and skills to engage successfully,
with little instruction, in reading and interpreting complex appellate court
opinions, in understanding complicated discussions of these opinions, and in
writing clearly, coherently, and even imaginatively about difficult problems.36
But if these assumptions do not hold, the case method/final examination law
school may be producing a more limited and far different set of skills from those
skills that expert case method professors intend to teach. Reading cases and
understanding the case method may be reduced by many students to a search for
knowledge or meaning through rereadings, feedback, revisions, and self-editing).
32 See, e.g., Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women,
40 STAN. L. REv. 1299, 1332-45 (1988) (describing a competitive "non-conversational" form
of speech in classrooms at Yale Law School).
33 See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 2, at 427 (suggesting that today's law students prefer
the teaching of "legal conclusions" rather than "legal arguments").
34 See generally Roy E. Rickson, Faculty Control and the Structure of Student
Competition: An Analysis of the Law Student Role, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1973) (suggesting
that competitiveness among law students limits their learning by inhibiting information
exchange).
3 5 Cf SECrION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR PROF'L COMM., ABA,
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 13-25 (1996); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR PROF'L COMM., ABA, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM:
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 25-63 (1997) (expressing concerns about the lack of law school
interest in issues of legal professionalism); Richard B. Cappalli, The Disappearance of Legal
Method, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 393, 405-11 (1997) (describing the apparent disappearance or
decline of law school interest in teaching methods of appellate argument).
36 Sophisticated versions of the case method require much intellectual dexterity as well as
considerable imagination if students are to comprehend, reconstruct, and apply usefully the
multiple dimensions of complex judicial opinions. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 109-
62; Morgan, supra note 14, at 384-87. Similarly, if new lawyers are to have or develop
sophisticated writing habits despite their substantial, experience in law schools with the rather
mechanical writing that is demanded by law school examinations, they must have acquired a
basis for such writing from their undergraduate education. On the nature of "the paradigm of
good paragraph thinkingAvriting" that is encouraged by law school examinations and its
deficiencies elsewhere, see Kissam, supra note 15, at 443-44, 474-79.
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doctrinal rules that can be used to answer final examination problems but not
many other basic legal issues.37 Legal thought and writing may be reduced to the
mechanics of the "paradigm of good paragraph thinking/writing," an
instrumentalist paradigm which suffices for writing successful examination
answers but in other contexts can often produce excessive complexity,
mechanical fragmented thought, and even incoherence.3 8 The idea of making
sound judgments about rhetoric or solving problems may be reduced to making
the quick, impulsive, rule-oriented judgments that suffice for making productive
responses in case method classes or on examinations but lack the awareness of
context, the balancing of competing values, and the application of common sense
that infuse sound practical judgments. 39 Law students who are inexperienced at
contemplating ethical questions are also left free by the case method/final
examination system to assume simply that good lawyering separates ethics from
technique and consists only of an amoral, technically proficient advocacy 40
These effects may all be important consequences that result from the combination
of a predominantly case method/final examination pedagogy with the modem
transformations of the American university.
Ironically, the structural transformation of research universities helps
entrench the case method/final examination system at the same time that it places
demands upon law schools for a richer, more extensive education. Although most
law schools have not been directly affected by the vast expansion of funding for
university research, contemporary law professors have become both participants
in and subjects to the modem research orientation of the American university.
Publication standards for tenure, salary increases, and chaired positions have
emerged and been progressively heightened over the past few decades not only in
research universities but in their law schools.41 More generally, the research-
oriented atmosphere and tacit cultural norms of the research university clearly
have affected many law professors and law school deans, as evidenced by the
proliferation of publications by law professors in recent years42 and the urgency
with which many schools today promote the reputation of their faculties by
disseminating glossy brochures and alumni publications that trumpet the recent
publications of home faculty. One consequence of these new commitments to
research, of course, is the diminished time, if not also the diminished interest, that
37 See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 2, at 503-04; Fajans & Falk, supra note 12, at 164;
Markovits, supra note 2, at 427.
38 See Kissam, supra note 15, at 443-44,474-79.
39 On the nature of sound practical judgments we would like lawyers to exercise, see
KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 11-162.
4 0 See, e.g, Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247,247-52 (1978).
41 See, e.g., Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 251,271-76 (1986).
4 2 See Saks et al., supra note 24, at 364.
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law faculty have to commit to their teaching 43 In this environment, the simple
replication of case method teaching and traditional examinations, with perhaps
even less attention to feedback to students, seems inevitable.
More subtly, American research universities also appear to be changing their
purposes or ideology from "reason" and "culture" to what Bill Readings has
labeled "excellence," 44 and this ideological change has implications for legal
education too. According to Readings, the ideology of excellence is
fundamentally nonreferential: That is, in contemporary universities one may be
excellent in many things or anything, and reason or culture may have little to do
with excellence. One may be academically excellent in using reason or in
cultivating minds, but one may also be academically excellent in obtaining good
grades or publishing in prestigious journals without reference to the reason or
culture of the work. For example, one may be an "excellent student" by getting
top scores on aptitude tests and the best grades in courses, no matter what subjects
are studied or what learning process has been pursued, and this excellence may
have little to do with one's reading and writing abilities or one's intellectual
curiosity and experience. Similarly, one can be an "excellent teacher" by earning
top scores in student evaluations without reference to any other criteria of good
teaching such as the development of reasoning skills or the cultivation of good
writing habits.45 Or one can be an "excellent scholar" by producing large
quantities of publications or prestigious publications no matter what the subject or
quality of the scholarship.46 The ideology of excellence is not merely reductive,
however, as these examples suggest, for the governing idea of excellence allows
the university (or "multiversity" as Clark Kerr renamed it) to take on as legitimate
many tasks so long as they are perceived as striving for some kind of
excellence.47 Thus, the university of excellence also embraces many innovative,
nontraditional ideas about teaching or scholarship, as long as they can be
perceived as academically excellent in some way, and indeed the new
43 See, e.g., Elson, supra note 3, at 343; Terrence Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of
Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 165-66 (1984).
44 READINGs, supra note 1, at 21-43.
45 See JOHN A. CENTRA, DETERMINING FACULTY EFFECrVENESS: AsSESSING TEACHING,
RESEARCH, AND SERVICE FOR PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND IMPROVEMENT 1-46 (1979)
(describing a marked increase in the use of student evaluations of teaching by American
universities in the 1970s and attributing this to the need of university administrators to make
more discriminating choices about tenure, salary increases, and other employment matters);
Markovits, supra note 2, at 420-23 (describing the impact of student evaluations on law
teaching).
4 6 See, e.g., GRAHAM & DIAMOND, supra note 29, at 235-48 (relying heavily upon
"publication counts" as a means of ranking American research universities); Markovits, supra
note 2, at 423 (describing an increased attention of law professors to the prestige of law reviews
in which they and their colleagues publish).
4 7 See CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERsrrY 18-20 (3d ed. 1982); READINGS,
supra note 1, at 28-43.
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professional reforms of legal education may qualify more easily for full
acceptance by the university of excellence than they did before in the older
university of reason and theory.
The university of excellence has replaced the older university of reason and
culture for a complex set of reasons. The expansion of universities, especially
public universities, and the vast increase in funding for university research in
basic sciences, medical sciences, and defense-related research since World War II
are certainly major causes. The increased openness of research universities to the
financial, political, and ideological influence of business corporations is certainly
another.48 The modem bureaucratization of research universities to deal with
external influences and to apply "rigorous" measures of accountability to faculty
performances also has supported the displacement of reason and culture by the
ideology or purpose of excellence. But whatever its nature and causes, the
university of excellence clearly has shifted power and influence from faculty
members, who specialized in reason and culture, to administrators and external
polieymakers, who specialize among other things in establishing "objective
criteria" of "excellence" for teaching, research and scholarship, and other relevant
aspects of education's work.49
The ideology of excellence may contribute to diminished interests in reading,
writing, and intellectual exploration among those students who learn to pursue
excellence rather than reason or culture. The university of excellence also may
contribute, as a matter of ideology or bureaucratic accountability, to the marked
penchant among many law professors to commit their efforts to scholarship,
consultations, and their specialized subdisciplines while leaving aside questions
about what should be done to provide good training for new lawyers who will
begin their practices in the diverse sectors of the American legal profession.50
Moreover, these two tendencies combine in something of a pincers movement to
restrict the qualifies of legal education. Law students trained in the university of
excellence may be less capable or less interested in learning from the traditional
case method or in writing competently about complex matters without extensive
instruction or practice.51 Meanwhile, law professors are committed by the
48 See GRAHAM & DIAMOND, supra note 29, at 26-50; READINGS, supra note 1, at 21-43.
4 9 See generally READINGS, supra note 1; Kissam, supra note 41, at 271-76.50 See, e.g., Elson, supra note 3, at 350-51; Sandalow, supra note 43, at 165-66 ("Faculty
members concerned primarily with their scholarly specialties are likely to direct their courses
toward enhancing student understanding of those specialties rather than concerning themselves
with the broader aspects of legal education... "'); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline:
The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82
MINN. L. REv. 705,747-56 (1998).
51 Cf Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of
Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 474,478 (1993) (reporting a survey of lawyers in Chicago and
Missouri who believe that "oral communication" and "written communication" are the most
important legal skills and that law schools are deficient in producing students with these skills).
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university of excellence to achieving excellence in scholarship (or consulting or
teaching special subjects) and will want to rely on the case method, which
includes much lecturing or "Socratic monologues" about cases, and traditional
examinations in order to preserve their time and energy to pursue this
excellence 52 Thus more extensive instruction of law students seems needed in
today's university of excellence, but basic values of this university point law
faculty and administrators in a different direction.
Another transformative force in the modem research university must be
considered. While undergraduate education today remains largely a matter of
reading books, attending lectures, participating in class discussions, performing
laboratory work, and writing papers and examinations, the new computer
technology and information highway are surely bringing changes to this process.
Moreover, if recent experience is a guide, these changes are likely to be a
bewildering mixture of liberating and constraining or disciplining practices. For
example, the Internet provides low cost, rapid access to much greater amounts of
relevant information, but will discovering and reading this information on small
screens change the way one processes or understands the information? Will this
kind of reading make us more critical readers or less critical readers? Similarly,
the Internet classroom, with its elaborate electronic communications among
faculty and students, promises more individualized student-faculty contacts,
which surely can enhance learning, but might not these changes on balance tend
to discipline students into undertaking more exhaustive (or exhausting) reading
assignments as they pursue the many leads of hyptertext lessons?53 Laptop
computers allow students to take verbatim notes more easily, but might not this
note-taking merely feed the law student's penchant for the many bits of positive
information that can be used on final examinations, and thereby diminish the
student's reflections about and synthesis of legal information that are such vital
parts of good professional learning and practice? Word processors surely can
facilitate writing, revising, and rewriting complicated texts, but might not this
writing and editing on balance tend to produce more frequent, more complex, and
longer texts that fail to improve writing quality?54 In any event, we can be
52 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 264-70; Sandalow, supra note 43, at 165-66, 169-72.
53 See generally THE WEST NETWORK: BRiDGiNG THE MIE wrrH TWEN, DESKTOP
COLLEAGUE, March, 1998, at 1, 1, 3 (describing Professor Philip Bouchard's Internet classroom
at the Western New England College School of Law); William R. Slomanson, Electronic
Lawyering and the Academy, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 216 (1998) (discussing web-based classes).
54 Cf Jeff Madrick, Computers: Waiting for the Revolution, NY REV. BOOKS, Mar. 26,
1998, at 29, 31, stating:
Why haven't computers dramatically augmented productivity? Some analysts believe
that the enormous power of computers is often superfluous. For example, law briefs are
now much thicker and more detailed than they once were, thanks to word processing and
the greater ease in obtaining supporting documents. But this does not mean that law is
being practiced any more efficiently; perhaps just the opposite is true.
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relatively sure that law students trained on word processors and the Internet will
be different from students trained exclusively on books, lectures, and class
discussions. And these new model students, like students in the university of
excellence, may be more interested in securing the rules or bits of positive law
they need to compete for grades than they are in attending to the complex
practices of critical reading, critical writing, practical judgment, and ethical
contemplation that are still needed by effective legal practitioners. Law schools
ought to be concerned about this possibility.
The university of excellence may seem superficial by comparison to
traditional university ideals, but this ideology also has its positive features. It
expands the possibilities for programmatic and individual innovations in
universities as long as one can establish a claim for excellence under some kind of
educational or academic criterion. Struggles may ensue over the proper standards
of excellence to apply to innovations,55 but the ideology of excellence has shifted
the playing field and opened up new spaces at the margins at least for
experimenting and challenging the traditional conventions of a university
education. Indeed, the expanding presence in most law schools of the professional
reforms of legal education may be viewed as an instance of such innovations
being embraced by the university of excellence, as its criteria of excellence have
expanded from reason, theory, and expansion of culture to also include excellence
in practice-oriented education.
B. The Legal Profession
Like universities, the American legal profession has been transformed in the
postwar era. These changes are demanding that law schools do more, not less, to
train competent lawyers, but these changes are also limiting the capacities of law
schools to provide more extensive education. In effect, contradictory external
forces are entrenching the case method/final examination law school while
simultaneously challenging its deep assumptions.
In the nineteenth century the American legal profession was diversifying, but
it fairly may be said that the profession then was centered around litigation and
appellate law.56 Langdell's installation of casebooks, the case method, and final
examinations as the virtually exclusive method of the modem law school was
thus understandable, if not also commendable, in that this regimen focused law
school inhabitants upon appellate law. But the work in today's highly specialized
Id.
55 See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 3, at 196 (describing current disputes within law schools
over the appropriate standards for evaluating new kinds of scholarship); Markovits, supra note
2, at 418-27 (describing changes in standards for evaluating teaching and scholarship and
attributing these changes in part to new uncertainties about law teaching and legal scholarship).
5 6 See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 525-66 (1973);
JONATHAN LURB, LAW AND THENATION, 1865-1912, at 43-54 (1983).
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and diverse profession is less concerned with litigation and appellate law, and the
nature of effective legal education for beginners may be quite different. To be
sure, lawyers of all kinds rely to an extent upon appellate law. Further, most law
students presumably desire a generalist training that can help qualify them for the
most desirable kinds of legal work, including complex doctrinal work in
corporate law firms, especially since most students begin law school with
relatively few ideas about the kinds of legal work they ultimately will want or
seek. What is in question, then, is not specialist versus generalist training, but the
kind of generalist training that would be most appropriate for entrants into the
diversified legal profession of the twenty-first century.
The contemporary transformations of the legal profession include a vast
increase in the number of American lawyers, the increasing division of the
profession into highly specialized and essentially unrelated sectors, the expansion
and specialization of large corporate law firms, and the new "open
competitiveness" or "commercialization" of law practices. Also, law graduates
today often do not practice law but work in law-related businesses such as
banking or insurance law or directly in business management or public
administration. 57 These changes help entrench the doctrinal specialization, case
method and final examination/grading class ranking system of law schools. At
the same time, these changes are demanding or inviting law schools to diversify
and enrich the kinds of training they provide to prospective lawyers in ways that
diverge from the case method and traditional final examinations. The most
concrete evidence of these demands, of course, consist of the legal profession's
apparent interest in promoting law school training in the "skills and values" that
are associated with legal research and writing programs, law school clinics, and
law school courses in legal ethics.
The transformations of the profession support the case method/final
examination system in several ways. Students and faculty alike realize that law
school grades and class ranks today are more important than ever to students who
wish to compete for employment with high paying corporate law firms or to
compete for employment of any kind in the stagnant market for lawyers that
developed in the mid-1990s. Law firms also may be paying more attention to the
grades and class ranks of prospective employees to help maintain their reputations
in the increasingly competitive markets for legal services. Thus, within law
schools, law professors will surely understand at least tacitly that they must
administer "fair" and "objective' procedures to distribute the many different
grades that are necessary to comply with mandatory grading curves, which are
intended to establish fair or legitimate class ranking systems.58 An efficient way
57 See RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 166-72, 177 (1989); MARC GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 121
(1991); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS wrrH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATON OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 57 (1988); MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-102.
58 See generally Robert C. Downs & Nancy Levit, Ifit Can't Be Lake Woebegone... A
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to implement this grading is to offer case method classes, which concentrate on
the "analysis" of "leading cases," and then require students at the end of each
course to quickly "identify issues," recall 'he rules," and "apply" the rules to
novel fact situations on time-limited comprehensive examinations for which no
supervised practice or mid-term examinations have been provided. The basic
disjunction between case method analysis in the classroom and the rule-oriented
process of identifying and quickly resolving novel, surprising situations on time-
limited final examinations makes it relatively easy to draw the many fine
distinctions between student examination performances that are required by
mandatory grading curves.59 In contrast, providing students with supervised
practice and individualized feedback in solving examination problems is likely to
make it more difficult to draw discrete grading distinctions because supervised
practice on a basic set of issues and skills tends to narrow or mitigate performance
differences. 60 The case method thus serves the examination/grading/class ranking
system of law schools quietly and efficiently, in a way that other kinds of law
teaching, for example, clinics and paper-writing courses, cannot
The diversification, specialization, and competitiveness among modem law
firms also create incentives for law schools to provide many specialized doctrinal
courses. Law firms often look to hire doctrinal specialists on law faculties as
consultants, and law schools compete with each other to offer specialized courses
to students who think they will need these courses for employment or who
otherwise desire them. These impulses for doctrinal specialization, of course, feed
the tendencies of law professors to concentrate their scholarship in specialized
fields and to rely on the case method and final examinations as their basic
teaching method. This traditional form of teaching is often related to their
scholarship, and in any event it will save them time and energy for scholarship or
consulting.
But the transformations of the legal profession are demanding more of law
schools than an objective class ranking system and the expanded coverage of
legal doctrine. Most poignantly, as law firms and lawyers become busier, more
competitive and more specialized, and as lawyer employees become more
expensive, legal employers rationally are looking to transfer training costs
elsewhere-to law schools. 61 Law firms and other employers also want their new
lawyers to be better critical readers, better researchers, better writers, better
Nationwide Survey of Law School Grading and Grade Normalization Practices, 65 U. Mo.
KAN.-CrrY L. REV. 819 (1997) (describing the increased use of mandatory grading curves in
contemporary law schools).
59 See Kissam, supra note 15, at 437-52.
60 See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 8, at 545-51; Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman,
Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L. . 875, 918-25 (1985); Owen 3. Roberts, Methods for
Review and Quiz in "Case System" Law Schools, 1 AM. L. SCH. REv. 222,223-24 (1904).
61 See Roger Cramton, Change and Continuity in Legal Education, 79 MICH. L. REV. 460,
466 (1981).
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oralists, more practical, common sense thinkers, and more imaginative thinkers
than they have been historically.62 The specific nature of the new knowledge and
skills that are desired varies considerably across the profession; judges may desire
better trial advocates, corporate firms better researchers, and so on. In general,
however, the new demands on legal education are demands that law school
graduates should have both experience and facility with the rhetorical skills of
communicating complicated ideas to many different audiences in a persuasive
manner63 and the "common sense" skills of making practical and ethical
judgments to help solve legal problems.64
Law professors generally have maintained that the case method, at least in the
hands of master teachers, promotes critical reading, legal analysis necessary for
effective research and writing, imaginative thought and sound judgment.65 This
view, however, is based upon deep assumptions about the reception of the case
method among students and ignores the fact that most law teachers are not master
teachers-much as we might like to think. It ignores the available, if limited
evidence, which suggests that law students tend to ignore learning in case method
classrooms to prepare efficiently for their examinations.66 It also ignores the
possibility that a steady diet of case method classes and issue-spotting
examinations does not instruct most students effectively in such basic "case
method skills" as distinguishing case holdings from dicta, interpreting legal rules
by reference to their purposes, or reading statutory provisions carefully,
skeptically and with attention to possible ambiguities.67 To be sure, case method
classes suffice to get most students through examinations, through bar
examinations, and into employment. But the effectiveness of this method for
other purposes has always been in doubt,68 and the contemporary transformations
of the research university and legal profession should only increase our doubts.
Thus the bind for law schools. On the one hand, both the university of
excellence and external constituencies are demanding more of traditional law
school methods. In other words, they are demanding case method teaching and an
examination/grading/class ranking system that generates many distinct grades and
class ranks while leaving law professors free to produce large quantities of
scholarship that are believed to enhance the reputation of their law schools,
62 See, e.g., Garth & Martin, supra note 51, at 472-77.
63 See id. (reporting that lawyers in both Chicago and Missouri give very high priorities to
training law students in general oral and written communication); see generally Greenshaw,
supra note 7 (describing actual and possible training in legal rhetoric).
64 See, e.g., MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 141-57; see also KRONMAN, supra note
1, at 11-162 (describing the nature of sound practical judgments by lawyers and some
possibilities of achieving training in this through the use of the case method).
65 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 109-62; Morgan, supra note 14, at 381-82.
66 See Rickson, supra note 34, at 54.
67 See Bryden, supra note 2, at 480-81.
68 See STEVENS, supra note 13, at 39-40, 57-59, 117-23 (describing early doubts).
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universities, and alumni. On the other hand, various constituencies in the legal
profession are demanding more effective forms of education that point beyond the
case method and final examinations-towards an education that generates better
readers and writers and more imaginative, practical, and ethical problem-solvers.
The response of modem law schools to these dilemmas has been to
supplement the case method/final examination system by adding limited versions
of the three professional or practice-oriented reforms to legal education. These
reforms have been perceived as mere supplements to case method training in
legal doctrine and analytical skills and accordingly, have been given only a
limited scope.69 But these reforms contain educational principles that, if taken
seriously, would substantially challenge our beliefs in the efficacy of the case
method/final examination law school. Part III of this Article explores the history
of these reforms, paying special attention to the ways in which the reforms in
principle challenge the case method/final examination system and to the ways in
which assumptions about the research university and university law school have
limited these reforms, caused disintegrations within them, and obscured their
fundamental principles.
11. THE PROFESSIONAL REFORMS
American law schools operated throughout the first half of the twentieth
century with a relatively simple program based on Dean Langdell's innovations at
Harvard. Courses on legal doctrine were taught by the case method with a final
examination at the end of each course. Law students were required to take a legal
bibliography course, which prepared them to do research in practice. Moot courts
were available on an optional or required basis, and at elite law schools a student-
edited, student-managed law review provided opportunities for sustained research
and expository writing to those few students who obtained top grades on their first
year examinations and were admitted to law review. Apart from these minimal
supplements, legal education was devoted to case method courses and final
examinations that engaged students in applying appellate law to novel fact
situations. Scholarship was performed mostly by professors at elite schools, and
this was case method scholarship about legal doctrine until Legal Realism
introduced social contexts and interdisciplinary studies into the margins of
scholarship in the 1930s.70
There were, to be sure, stirrings of change in law teaching before World War
II. In the 1920s, Columbia Law School experimented with new kinds of reading
materials and new courses in order to develop a "functional" rather than
69 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 5, at 33-42; Spiegel, supra note 16, at 577.
70 See STEVENS, supra note 13, at 35-199; Marjorie Dick Rombauer, First-Year Legal
Research and Writing: Then and Now, 25 1 LEGAL EDUC. 538, 540-41 (1973); see generally
John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 311 (1985);
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"doctrinal" curriculum.71 In the 1930s, John Bradway and Jerome Frank argued
for learning law by representing clients,72 and the University of Chicago Law
School started its research and writing program for first year students in 1938Y3
But case method classes and final examinations remained the basic program at
most law schools (at least for students not on law review) throughout the first half
of the twentieth century and into its second half as well.
After World War II, the expansion of American universities and law schools
and the influx of veterans to law schools generated new resources and new
democratic motivations to make changes to the basic program.74 The one
professional reform implemented at this time was the first year course in "legal
writing," which subsequently was combined with legal bibliography to constitute
a single legal research and writing course.75 Initially, the new writing programs
were designed to expose law students to thought and writing not included within
case method courses and provide opportunities for extensive research and legal
analysis comparable to the experience of law review students.76 But the first year
writing course has been in a state of constant flux at most law schools ever since,
as law schools have experimented with a great variety of structures in order to
achieve better results from limited resources. 7 More recently, many schools have
added an "upper class research and writing requirement," which typically is
satisfied by the completion of a seminar paper or work on law review.7 8 The
proliferation of seminars and multiple law reviews at many schools may also be
7 1 See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study (pts. 1 & 3), 3 J. LEGAL EDUC.
331,332-34 (1951), 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1-78 (1955).
72 See generally John Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, I
U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1933); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L.
REv. 907 (1933).
73 See Harry Kalven, Jr., Law School Training in Research and Exposition: The
University of Chicago Program, I J. LEGAL EDUC. 107, 108 (1948).
7 4 See generally AALS Committee on Curriculum, The Place of Skills in Legal Education,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 345 (1945) (having been chaired by Karl Llewellyn).
7 5 See Rombauer, supra note 70, at 539-42.
76 See Kalven, supra note 73, at 110 n.6; Howard C. Westwood, The Law Review Should
Become the Law School, 31 VA. L. REv. 913, 913-14 (1945).
7 7 See generally Allen Boyer, Legal Writing Programs Reviewed: Merits, Flaws, Costs
and Essentials, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1985) (describing three basic models for the first year
writing course); Helene S. Shapo, The Frontiers of Legal Writing: Challenges for Teaching
Research, 78 L. LIBR. J. 719, 721-24 (1986) (describing eight models of instruction for legal
writing courses).
78 See William J. Bridge, Legal Writing After the First Year of Law School, 5 OHIo N.U.
L. REv. 411,423-24, 426-28 (1978); George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa
Loquiter, 86 MICH. L. REV. 333, 355-56 (1987); see generally S. Blair Kauffman, Advanced
Legal Research Courses: A New Trend in American Legal Education, 6 LEGAL REF. SERvs. Q.,
Fall/Winter 1986, at 123-39.
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viewed as part of the modem expansion of writing opportunities.79
Starting in the 1960s, clinical education became another significant presence
as law schools opened legal clinics to make legal education "more relevant" and
to help the legal profession meet its new constitutional and ethical duties to
provide legal services to the poor.80 Subsequently, simulated clinical courses,
especially in trial advocacy, were developed in response to allegations by judges
and professional organizations that new lawyers were deficient in trial skills. 81
The development of clinical programs has largely continued in the 1980s and
1990s, limited by available resources but stimulated by new ABA accreditation
standards and several task force studies, most recently the MacCrate Report.82
In the 1970s, the Watergate affair aroused public and professional concerns
about the ethical behavior of lawyers, and the profession responded by
establishing a professional ethics part to state bar examinations and by requiring
law schools to teach "legal ethics."'83 Law schools traditionally had adopted a
minimalist approach to teaching legal or professional ethics, and, responding to
the ABA requirement, they simply added a required course.84 But the ABA's
interest in promoting training in legal ethics and legal professionalism has
continued and, if anything, has increased as evidenced by the many concerns
about "professionalism" expressed in recent task force and committee reports.85
These professional reforms were started for a complex set of political and
educational reasons, and they have been subjected to numerous constraints,
including strategies or traditions of the university law school that would limit the
reforms and assimilate them into the case method/final examination system. Thus,
each reform has been developed as a specialized compartment within the already
highly compartmentalized structure of the law school curriculum. The
79 On the proliferation of law school clinics, see, for example, Eleanor M. Fox, The Good
Law School, The Good Curriculum, and the Mind and the Heart, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473,476-
81 (1989). On the proliferation of multiple law reviews at individual law schools, see Saks et
al., supra note 24, at 363, 373.
80 See, e.g., AALS & ABA COMMrIrTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 7-8 (1980) [hereinafter CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION]; William Pincus, Clinical Legal Education in the United States, 1968-1975, 49
AUSTRALAN L.J. 420,420-22 (1975).
81 See CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 80, at 7-8; see generally Roger C.
Cramton & Erik M. Jensen, The State of Trial Advocacy and Legal Education: Three New
Studies, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1979).
82 See supra note 4.
83 See MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 2 (1980).
84 See id. at 5--21.
85 See generally ABA, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986); ABA, TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFEssIONALISM: REPORT OF THE PROFEsSIONALIsM COMMrTrEE (1996); ABA, TEACHNG
AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS (1997); MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 4.
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administrative and political structures of these programs have been splintered,
especially by the employment of part-time teachers, contract teachers, faculty
with "special" tenure status, and student teaching assistants in lieu of full-time
tenure-track professors. This insures that the specialists in these fields are without
political power or incentives to do much more than establish their own niches
within law schools. The concurrent development of the reforms since the 1970s
has also meant that these programs compete with each other for new resources,
insuring that their proponents tend to be competitors rather than allies in
reforming the curriculum.86 Basic ideas of the case method/final examination law
school have also infiltrated the professional reforms in ways that limit their
reformist qualities and ensure their loyalty to the university law school.
In light of their complex origins and constraints, detailed examination of the
histories and practices of the reforms is necessary to recover their basic
educational principles. These principles, as will be discovered, have considerable
promise for redirecting law schools towards more effective and more democratic
education. In particular, both legal writing and clinical education emphasize the
importance of acquiring different kinds of tacit professional knowledge that are
best obtained by active practice with supervision and sympathetic feedback from
more experienced practitioners, and all three reforms point towards experience
and skills in making practical or rhetorical judgments. The reforms, especially
ethics training at its best, can also promote reflection about ethical issues that are
integral to many aspects of legal work. Further, legal writing courses rest on the
most powerful principle of learning by writing, a principle that could enhance all
legal education including, especially, education in tacit professional knowledge,
education in making practical or rhetorical judgments, and education in ethical
reflection. Moreover, these principles, in particular those of supervision and
feedback on writing projects, can help provide more attention, perhaps equal
attention, to each individual student, thus democratizing legal education in a way
that was promised but never fully realized by the original legal writing programs.
Of course, once the basic principles of the professional reforms have been
recovered, they will need to be translated into workable methods that can be
implemented in mainstream doctrinal courses. Likely objections to this
implementation must also be answered. But translation and justification are the
tasks of Part IV. This Part focuses on extracting the basic principles from reform
practices.
86 See Beverly Balos, Conferring on the MacCrate Report: A Clinical Gaze, I CLINICAL
L. REV. 349,353-54 (1994).
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A. Legal Writing Programs
It is curious that law schools only recently have paid curricular attention to
education in writing for lawyers. This is a particular anomaly in the legal
profession, in which communication is essential and words are "the skin of a
living thought"
-Helene S. Shapo87
Perhaps ideally, all faculty members would devote the major portion of their
time to teaching writing, research, and analytical skills to each student
individually. Needless to say, this would be a more time-consuming program
than most faculties would tolerate. J
-Stewart Macaulay & Henry G. Manne88
Law schools began to introduce writing programs into the curriculum under
two different influences. One was the Legal Realist critique of legal education,
which called for "some realism" about professional training and the provision for
more comprehensive education in the activities of practicing lawyers.89 The
second consisted of the egalitarian or democratic values of the New Deal and
World War II, which suggested that more attention and resources be paid to the
majority of law students who do not obtain the educational benefits of a law
review experience.90 The writing programs instituted after World War II were
thus designed to provide writing opportunities that would be different from the
writing of examinations, would involve much individualized feedback from more
experienced writers and would entail much rewriting, especially of
memorandums that attempt to resolve client problems.91 As writing programs
have developed and expanded, however, they have become subject to a host of
competing purposes and competing conceptions about writing or how to
implement writing, to say nothing of limited resources and the unwillingness of
most full-time faculty to supervise student writing. While new resources have
87 Shapo, supra note 77, at 719 (footnotes omitted).
88 Stewart Macaulay & Henry G. Manne, A Low-Cost Legal Writing Program-The
Wisconsin Experience, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 387,388 (1959).
8 9 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 19 (1930) (noting the limited
professional value of case method training); Karl Llewellyn, On fhat Is Wrong with So-Called
Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 674-76 (1935) (recommending clinical training for
law students); see generally Frank, supra note 72 (recommending that law students be provided
broader training in reading and writing law).
9 0 See Kalven, supra note 73, at 107-08, 108 n.1, 110 n.6, 112; Roy Moreland, Legal
Writing and Research in the Smaller Schools, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52-55 (1954); Westwood,
supra note 76, at 916-17.
91 See Burton Kanter, Effective Legal Writing-Some Thoughts and Reflections on
Learning and Teaching, 42 CHI. B. REC. 113, 113-18; see also Kalven, supra note 73, at 110-
13; Moreland, supra note 90, at 54, 56-57.
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been provided and particular improvements have surely occurred, experienced
observers today tend to agree that law school writing programs in general do not
come very close to their goal of providing substantial, meaningful, student-
centered learning experiences that are based on the writing process.
92
The modem university law school thus incorporates both an "ideal
conception" of writing and a "fragmented reality" of writing programs that does
not approach this ideal and often points in other directions. This ideal, this reality,
and the yawning gap between them serve the case method/final examination law
school quite nicely. The ideal helps legitimate case method teaching by signaling
to the profession, law students, and prospective students in a general way that law
graduates will be effective writers. Meanwhile, the fragmented reality of actual
programs reduces the implicit threat that writing poses to the values of teaching
by the traditional case method/final examination system.
The ideal conception of law school writing may be summarized by a series of
principles that articulate ways to use writing as an experience-based learning
process to acquire legal knowledge and a variety of skills. The most fundamental
principle states that legal research, legal thought, and legal writing should be
integrated exercises in order that students will experience and understand the
vital, often tacit interconnections between effective research, the analysis of
problems that often shifts as research and writing progresses, and the rethinking
and rewriting of documents that so often informs effective research and
analysis.93 Moreover, these integrated exercises should be continued and
intensified throughout the three year curriculum in order to take advantage of the
increasing knowledge and confidence of students in applying legal techniques.94
This practice should provide many opportunities for revising legal texts on the
basis of feedback from more experienced writers or, more simply, from rereading
one's own text,95 in order to help students acquire a capacity to reflect and to
evaluate their problem solving work and to make adjustments to their work-a
92 See, e.g., Gopen, supra note 78, at 355-62; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 36-
37; Shapo, supra note 77, at 725. A short list of exceptional law school writing programs would
probably include the programs at Brooklyn, Chicago-Kent, Montana, NYU, and the University
of Chicago. See Bari R. Burke, Legal Writing (Groups) at the University of Montana:
Professional Voice Lessons in a Communal Context, 52 MONT. L. REv. 373, 396-98 (1991);
Fajans & Falk, supra note 12, at 173-74; Gopen, supra note 78, at 356-62; Kalven, supra note
73, at 107-08; Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools: A
CriticalAssessment, 24 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 1, 19-27 (1992); see generally SECTION ON LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISsION TO THE BAR, ABA, SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRTNG PROGRAMS (1997).
93 See Rombauer, supra note 70, at 540-41; Shapo, supra note 77, at 726-28.
94 See Robert C. Berring & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Legal Research: Should Students
Learn It or Wing It?, 81 L. LDaR. J. 431,441 (1989) (arguing that genuine instruction in legal
research can only be accomplished in the second and third years of law school).
95 See Kalven, supra note 73, at 114-16; Moreland, supra note 90, at 56; Harry Pratter &
Burton W. Kanter, Expanding the Tutorial Program: A Bloodless Revolution, 7 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 395,407 (1955); Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 61-93.
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capacity which is essential for many kinds of high quality professional work.96
Law school writing should also involve many different kinds of documents (for
example, opinion letters, contracts, wills, pleadings, and legislation) to introduce
students to the varied contexts and audiences for whom lawyers must write.97
Substantial feedback followed by rewriting also implies a need for certain
"collaborative" or 'joint" work between students and supervisors as a good,
perhaps essential, means by which experienced supervisors can convey their
understandings of tacit professional knowledge to students. 98
More generally, law school writing should be governed by two principles
drawn from contemporary composition theory. One is that good substantive
writing should be learned and taught as a process in which the writer generates
substantive and stylistic knowledge by the act of writing itself and thus benefits
from much rereading, feedback, revisions and rewriting. The second is that good
writing should be learned and taught as a social act in which the writer enters into
a complex discourse between her own ideas and texts, the texts of others, the
readers of her texts, and the imagined ideal audience for each kind of writing.99
This conception of writing as a process and social act holds that it is a mistake to
think of writing as merely a product by which one instrumentally conveys
independently conceived thought in a clear and neutral manner.100
This ideal conception of the writing process serves the university law school
by enhancing claims about the effectiveness of law school training. Were this
ideal widely implemented, however, it would seriously challenge the case
method/final examination system. If legal writing "is basically 85 percent analysis
and 15 percent composition," 101 students and faculty who begin to use an
extensive writing process to learn law would soon discover that writing together
with feedback of various kinds is a far better means of learning most of the basic
skills of legal analysis, synthesis, and rhetoric than mere oral exchanges in case
96 See generally DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECrIVE PRACrmONER: How
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983) [hereinafter SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACITIIONER];
DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACITTIONER: TOWNARD A NEW DESIGN FOR
TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987) [hereinafter SCHON, EDUCATING THE
REFLECTIVE PRACITIONER].
97 See, e.g., Greenshaw, supra note 7, at 873-82 (emphasizing writing for varied contexts
and audiences as critical aspects of acquiring skills in legal rhetoric).
98 See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 61-93; cf. SCHON, EDUCATING THE
REFLECMIVE PRACITONER, supra note 96, at 41-172 (describing the collaborative transmission
of tacit professional knowledge in studio classes of architecture schools).
99 See Parker, supra note 7, at 565-67; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 51-61; cf
Mary Kate Keamey & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students How to "Think Like Lawyers".
Integrating Socratic Method with the Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 885, 885-908 (1991)
(elaborating methods for a "writing process perspective" in law school writing).
100 See Parker, supra note 7, at 565-67; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 51-61.
101 Gross, supra note 7, at 266 (quoting W.C. Warren, The Teaching of Legal Writing and
LegalResearch-A Panel, 52 L. LiBR. J. 350,352 (1959)).
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method classrooms and the instrumentalist writing that is demanded by final
examinations.102
The university law school has deployed several devices to devalue or
subjugate writing knowledge and the writing process, thus helping preserve an
emphasis on the case method and final examinations. First, attention to writing
has been limited primarily to a single required course in the first year that is
taught separately from doctrinal subjects.' 03 This separation signals that legal
writing is a "skill" separate and independent from legal analysis, and the first year
course engages students in writing law at the moment when they are least capable
of perceiving the possibilities of using writing to acquire and generate substantive
and procedural legal knowledge. To be sure, the proliferation of elective
seminars, upper class writing requirements, and new law reviews has increased
opportunities for student writing in upper class years. But the lack of formal
institutional attention and approbation continues to signal that writing is an
episodic, separate skill much less important than the analysis, thought, and oral,
brilliance of case method classrooms and that substantial writing in law school is
essentially a matter of personal choice. In sum, the separate and limited first year
writing course reflects and reinforces the widespread assumptions in law schools
that writing is merely a neutral instrument or skill for transferring independently
conceived thoughts and therefore that the only relevance of "legal writing" is as a
finished product. 104 This assumption misses or detracts from the possibility of
acquiring much invaluable professional knowledge by employing writing as a
learning process. 105 Of course, this assumption also protects the traditional case
method law school from significant changes.
Second, many law schools today are investing additional resources in
research and writing courses, and there is a marked attempt in these courses to
integrate research, methods of legal reasoning, and writing.106 But limited
resources and the fragmented structures of these courses diminish the
102 See Boyer, supra note 77, at 323-24; Gross, supra note 7, at 294-96. On a successful
experiment using frequent writing exercises to teach basic legal analysis, see Feinman &
Feldman, supra note 8, at 534-44. On the instrumentalist writing of final examinations, see
Kissam, supra note 15, at 500.
103 See Rideout & Rarnsfield, supra note 5, at 77; Shapo, supra note 77, at 720-21.
104 Cf Maxine Hairston, The Winds of Change: Thomas Kuhn and the Revolution in the
Teaching of Writing, 33 C. COMPOSmON & COMM. 76, 77-79 (1982), reprinted in RHETORIc
AND CoMPosmIoN: A SOURCEBOOK FOR TEACHERS AND WRITERS 3, 4-6 (Richard L. Graves
ed., 3d ed. 1990) (teaching English composition as a separate skills course emphasizes writing
as a finished product and denigrates the values of writing, teaching writing, and understanding
writing as a basic method or process for acquiring substantive knowledge).
105 See Reed Dickerson, Teaching Legal Writing in Law Schools: With a Special Nod to
Legal Drafting, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 86-89 (1979); Kissam, supra note 12, at 144; Rideout &
Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 51-52,61-74,84-85, 88-90,96-97.
10 6 See Neil Feigenson, Essay Review: Legal Writing Texts Today, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
503, 511-16 (1991); Shapo, supra note 77, at 724-28.
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opportunities for effective integrated experiences and contribute to the prevailing
view that writing is but a neutral instrument and that law school writing therefore
is, and ought to be, a subordinate subject. Many research and writing courses are
taught by adjunct part-time professors or third year students under the variable
supervision of full-time faculty, and these instructors are unlikely to have or
acquire much experience in teaching legal writing.107 Even when full-time
instructors are employed, they are often young lawyers or writing instructors who
are neither recognized nor paid as law professors and who experience rapid
turnover.108 The basic facts that most writing supervisors are not full-time
professors and that the research and writing course "typically carries less
academic credit than any other first-year offering" surely signal that writing is not
to be taken as seriously as substantive law school courses. 109 Further, some
courses still provide instruction in legal bibliography, legal reasoning, and legal
writing in separate units, reducing the possibility of tacit learning from integrated
exercises and reinforcing the perception that the mission of the course "is to
perfect [the] production of specific written forms."110 Research instruction by
part-time adjuncts and third year students also may tend "to be more idiosyncratic
and anecdotal than instruction informed by a more comprehensive study of the
types of research materials available in the law school library."'I  The limited
resources and fragmented structures of writing courses thus help eliminate the
challenges from the writing process to the case method/final examination law
school.
Third, the first year research and writing course is often perceived as mere
practice or training in performing the same analysis that is demanded by law
school classrooms and, more significantly, by final examinations.11 2 Typical
problems for research memorandums and other writing assignments are often
similar to final examination problems that invite arguments about applying rules
to given facts on tightly defined issues; 13 thus, many students may perceive
research and writing courses merely as ancillary means to help them negotiate the
case method/final examination system. In this perspective, legal research and
writing become an integral, if supplemental, part of the case method law school
and is no threat at all to traditional teaching methods.
107 See Gopen, supra note 78, at 356; Shapo, supra note 77, at 725.
108 See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 37-38 n.5, 87-88; Shapo, supra note 77, at
722.
109 Douglas E. Abrams, Integrating Legal Writing into Civil Procedure, 24 CoNN. L.
REV. 813, 817-18 (1992); Rideout & Ranisfield, supra note 5, at 77-78.
110 Feigenson, supra note 106, at 510.
111 Shapo, supra note 77, at 725.
112 See Mary Ellen Gale, Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 ALB. L.
REV. 298,299-300 (1980); Macauley & Manne, supra note 88, at 390.
113 See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 73, at 111-12; Macauley & Manne, supra note 88, at
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Finally, the traditions of the university law school infiltrate writing programs
in certain ways and thereby limit the possibilities for obtaining a rich education in
tacit professional knowledge acquired through the writing process. Most directly,
the law school often insists upon typical law school grading of law student
writing, particularly in first year research and writing courses when the
distribution of competitive grades is most important to establishing the class rank
of students. The imposition of law school grading curves on the writing process
diminishes the possibilities for sympathetic, constructive, and individualized
feedback from writing instructors, who must grade the finished product, to
students, who are required to produce the finished products "themselves" in order
to ensure a fair race for grades. Under the regime of law school grading curves, in
which many low grades must be dispensed and justified to students, there is also
less incentive for genuine collaborative work between instructors and students,
less incentive to create revision assignments (for a revised document will
constitute work of both the instructor and the student), and greater tendencies to
emphasize negative or delphic sorts of feedback as an easy, if tacit, way for
instructors to avoid participating too much in the revision of documents. 114
A common explanation for the fragmented, limited reality of law school
writing programs, of course, is scarce economic resources. But this explanation
disguises a more fundamental if less attractive explanation; the unwillingness or
distaste of most full-time law professors for "teaching writing, research, and
analytical skills to each student individually." 1 5 The basic ideology of the
university law school supports this unwillingness, intolerance, and indifference in
several ways. Most obviously, the university law school's pressures on faculty to
publish frequently or think of themselves primarily as scholars rather than
teachers may cause many professors to fear possible commitments of any
additional time to supervising individual students even though commitments may
depend upon the artfulness with which writing exercises are constructed. 116 Many
faculty also may sense the personal risks and painfulness involved in articulating
to students what is wrong with their writing and how it may be improved. 17
Moreover, many faculty may fear that if they must read many versions of student
114 See Kissam, supra note 12, at 169-79; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 91-93.
115 Macauley & Mannesupra note 88, at388.
116 For example, using upperclass students to supervise ungraded exercises written by
students in large doctrinal classes may not require much if any extra time from a law professor.
See generally Jay M. Feinman, Teaching Assistants, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 269 (1991). In addition
to fear about time, however, there also may be a "professional fear" among many law
professors about delegating their authority to "lesser experts" like teaching assistants, a fear
which seems to result from the university law school's incentives for law professors to model
expertise and for students to seek instruction only from "top experts." See Kissam, supra note
12, at 164-68. This fear may be even harder to overcome than fears about the loss of time. See
infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
117 Cf Kissam, supra note 15, at 472-73 (describing the problems that the presence of
tacit knowledge creates for discussing final examinations with law students).
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writing on the same problem, they will simply experience more of the same
boredom they do when reading examinations.118
In addition to these fears or beliefs, many professors and students in the
university law school appear to hold traditional views or misperceptions about
writing, legal writing, and the writing process, which obstruct effective education
through writing.1 19 One view is that good legal writing is just good writing and
there is no need to teach 'legal writing" as such beyond teaching particular forms
or remedial writing skills. Another view is that good writing is based primarily on
"natural talent' and cannot be taught, a view that would limit law school writing
programs to teaching legal bibliography, legal forms, and remedial grammar and
syntax. Other views perceive legal writing merely as ancillary means to the more
important "analysis" taught by the case method, views which relegate the
teaching of legal writing to writing instructors or practicing lawyers instead of
full-time professors. As a consequence, many law professors seem to believe that
teaching by writing is "anti-intellectual" or "low value" work by comparison to
their classroom performances, scholarship, and consulting work; thus, they ignore
the values of learning by writing and tend to keep specialized writing instructors
out of law schools or at least cabined within a subordinate niche.120 These views
are understandable in light of the paradigmatic significance the case method, final
examinations, and much instrunmentalist writing by law students and law
professors have come to assume within the university law school. These views,
however, are also tragic in terms of enriching contemporary legal education.
In sum, deep assumptions of the university law school regarding theoretical
knowledge, the case method, and the values of the final
examination/grading/class ranking system help entrench a fragmented reality of
writing activities that is far removed from any ideal conception. The significant
challenges to the case method/final examination law school from the professional
reform of law school writing and the basic principle of learning by writing are
thus kept under wraps, and the case method/final examination system retains a
privileged position.
118 On the substantial boredom that law professors experience reading final examination
answers, see Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1086 (1986);
George C. Christie, The Recruitment ofLaw Faculty, 1987 DuKE LJ. 306,310,315.
119 See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 40-48.
120 See id at 47-48.
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B. Clinical Education
But is it not plain that, without giving up entirely the case-book system or
the growing and valuable alliance with the so-called social sciences, the law
schools should once more get in intimate contact with what clients need and with
what courts and lawyers actually do?
-Jerome Frankl 21
'Clinics' were a frightening prospect to the traditional academic teachers.
-William Pincus 122
Clinical education, broadly defined, involves the performance of legal roles
by students in some kind of supervised setting.123 Students may represent live
clients in either in-house clinics or externships, and they may participate in
simulated clinical work in subjects such as trial advocacy, negotiations,
interviewing, or counseling.124 The basic point of clinical education is to integrate
doctrinal knowledge with skills in ways that involve the complicated and unruly
worlds of clients, facts, and problems to be solved, and this reform too, at least
implicitly, threatens basic values of the case method/final examination system.
Law schools began to develop clinics in the 1960s although a few models and
clinical critiques of legal education existed much earlier. 125 Several overlapping
forces provided a mixture of ideas, resources, and regulatory pressures that
encouraged law schools to develop clinics. Many clinics were established with
the purpose of providing student-centered, practice-oriented kinds of learning as a
model for what good legal education should be.'2 6 Some clinics were also
initiated with the primary purpose of providing better legal services to low-
income persons through direct services, law reform projects, and law student
training in the representation of low-income persons. 127 The organized bar also
has taken an interest in promoting law school clinics. Initially the legal profession
sought help in serving the increasing numbers of indigent persons who sought
121 Frank, supra note 72, at 913.
122 Pincus, supra note 80, at 422.
123 See, e.g., Marc Feldman, On the Mwgins of Legal Education, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 607,612-17 (1984-1985); In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 511.
124 See, e.g., Michael Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 162, 173-91 (1974); In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 511-17; Nina W.
Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 37 How. L. 31, 32-39 (1993).
125 See PILnp G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLECIONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION 3-7 (1998); Grossman, supra note 124, at 168-69; see gennerally Frank, supra
note 72 (offering a major early critique advocating clinical training in the 1930s).
126 See SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 125, at 5-6; Grossman, supra note 124, at 186-
93; Pincus, supra note 80, at 420-22.
127 See Grossman, supra note 124, at 173-80; Tan, supra note 124, at 32.
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free or low-cost legal services under the mandate and influence of judicial
decisions and the federal government's "War on Poverty" in the 1960s.128 More
recently, the organized bar has used accreditation measures and reform studies to
increase the pressure on law schools to provide at least minimal amounts of
clinical training to all interested students.129 Importantly, private foundations,
especially the Ford Foundation, and the federal government have made
substantial grants to help law schools initiate and develop clinical programs,
although this support is now receding.130
The basic instincts of the university law school have been to resist, limit, and
incorporate clinical education into itself in fragmented, compromised ways. Thus,
clinical training is a closely watched and regulated domain, especially because its
teaching methods and underlying philosophy markedly contrast with the case
method/final examination system. In essence, the university law school has
constrained clinical education by separating clinics from the core curriculum, by
marginalizing clinics in terms of its space, budget allocations, prestige, and
conceptualization and by infiltrating clinical programs with traditional techniques
of the university law school.131 Thus limited and tamed, clinics today help
legitimate the university law school as an institution of professional education,
provide t asitional bridges to practice, and provide temporary places of refuge or
resistance for students (and faculty) who desire relief or escape from the routines
of the core curriculum, case method, and final examinations.
The diffuse nature, purposes, and methods of clinical training 132 make it
somewhat difficult to generalize about this movement, but an ideal conception or
tacit jurisprudence of clinical education might be outlined as follows. 133 First,
128 See Grossman, supra note 124, at 173-78.
129 See ABA, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS,
Standard 405(e) (1992) (stating that the approved "law school should afford to full-time faculty
members whose primary responsibilities are in its professional skills program a form of security
of position reasonably similar to tenure and prerequisites reasonably similar to those provided
other full-time faculty members"); ABA, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND
INTERPRETATIONS, Standard 302(a)(iii) (1974) (stating that the approved 'law school
shall ... offer instruction in professional skills"); MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 330-34
(urging law schools to expand their training in "professional skills and values").
130 See SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 125, at 4-7; Pincus, supra note 80, at 421; Tarr,
supra note 124, at 37-38.
131 On the marginalization of clinics in general, see Feldman, supra note 123, at 607-11;
Tarr, supra note 124, at 40-43; see generally Mark V. Tushnet; Scenes from the Metropolitan
Underground: A Critical Perspective on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 272 (1984).
132 See In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 611-17; Tarr, supra note 124, at 32-39.
133 The following sketch draws heavily upon Anthony G. Amsterdam. See generally
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Centuy Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 612 (1984); Feldman, supra note 123, at 612-17; Frank, supra note 72; Donald A.
Sch6n, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 231 (1995).
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students are asked to perform legal roles that provide experience in practical
contexts that differ from the basic context of appellate court opinions and the case
method. In these contexts, facts are uncertain, contested, and, in some cases,
unknowable, and must be established through the instruments of the imperfect
memories, judgments, and intuitions of human agents. Clients often have goals
that are diffuse, unclear, and changeable, and these goals must be pursued and
clarified through ongoing discourse between attorneys and clients. Clients,
witnesses, and opposing parties also have their own emotions and ideas about law
that enter into client-attorney interactions. The clinical experience thus exposes
students to interactions with complex subjectivity and humanity, unruly factual
situations, practical judgments, and ethical issues that are essentially absent from
the case method, which typically assumes or stipulates to the facts and assumes a
standard abstract client with the simple goal of winning a lawsuit in appellate
court.
134
Second, students perform these roles under the supervision of experienced
instructors who try to provide helpful feedback and evaluation of the student's
work that will promote a client's interests and enhance the student's learning. In
principle, this supervision guides students through varied exercises that involve
applying doctrinal knowledge and skills in an integrated way to obtain practical
results. At its best, this work involves collective reflections upon the types of
ethical issues, situational evaluations, and practical judgments that must be made
in the legal profession. Thus, clinics ideally provide a supervised practice that
helps students acquire the kinds of tacit professional knowledge and related skills
of reflection that inform high quality professional practices. 135
The specific puiposes of clinics are so numerous, so often in conflict or
competition, and so complex that all of them may be impractical to achieve in any
particular clinical program.136 In general, clinics attempt to provide individually
supervised work experience that helps law students acquire the experience and
knowledge, including tacit knowledge, to make sound practical, rhetorical, and
ethical judgments under the stress of actual or simulated practice conditions. This
134 See generally Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1731 (1993).
135 See generally, e.g., Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency:
The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical
Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981); Michael Meltsner et a]., The Bike Tour Leader's
Dilemma: Talking About Supervision, 13 VT. L. REV. 399 (1989); Sch6n, supra note 133; Nina
W. Tarr, The Skill of Evaluation as an Explicit Goal of Clinical Training, 21 PAC. LJ. 967
(1990); Amy L. Ziegler, Developing a System of Evaluation in Clinical Legal Teaching, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 575 (1992).
136 See In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 511-17 (describing nine "principal goals"
of live client in-house clinics and arguing that "clinics provide the best opportunity in the
curriculum to integrate these manifold teaching goals," but also recognizing that "none of us
can be perfect exemplars of all of these qualities, and no one can teach all of these goals in our
clinic vith perfect emphasis").
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experience should also help establish useful perspectives on the complex
interrelationships between lawyers, uncertain clients, unruly facts, legal problems,
and social institutions. 137
This ideal conception of clinical Iraining threatens important aspects of the
university law school. 138 From the clinical perspective, the case method's
elimination of most aspects of the client from basic training can be perceived as
artificial and misleading. 139 The relentless insistence of the case method and final
examinations on rule-oriented analysis and judgments also may be perceived as a
poor way to train professionals for work that involves tacit knowledge and
making practical judgments in many uncertain and constantly varying situations.
Should such perceptions take hold, the case method/final examination system
might be limited to a small part of the curriculum to teach case analysis and
provide practice for bar examinations. More effective techniques such as lectures,
out-of-class readings, a variety of nonexamination writings, and computerized
exercises might be employed to teach doctrinal knowledge and basic legal
skills.140 In this event, "pre-clinical" or "quasi-clinical" methods and courses that
included much writing by students and much individually supervised student
work could replace case method classes.141 Law professors might even begin to
devote more time to professional instruction and less to producing the quantities
of scholarship that are emphasized by the assumptions and practices of the
traditional university law school. 142
This has not happened, of course, and economics, institutional inertia, and the
"frightening prospect" of clinics to "traditional" law professors are the usual
137 On the importance to effective practice of making sound practical judgments, see
KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 11-162 (discussing the importance of making good practical
judgments). On the importance of employing tacit knowledge and relying upon "perspectives,"
respectively, see generally SCHON, THE REFLECTVE PRACrONER, supra note 96; John 0.
Mudd, The Place of Perspective in Law and Legal Education, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 277 (1990-
1991); Sch6n, supra note 133 (discussing the role of tacit knowledge in practice and educating
law students for practice).138 See Feldman, supra note 123, at 621-45.
139 See generally Shalleck, supra note 134.
140 See, e.g., Walter Gellhom, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1, 3 (1964) (recommending lecturing in second and third year courses to cover doctrine);
James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought (and
Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 164 (1986) (recommending reading that is not
discussed in class as a means of introducing students to necessary doctrinal materials); infra
Part IV (describing nonexamination writing exercises).
141 See infra Part IV (describing "a quasi-clinical law schol'); cf. Rideout & Ramsfield,
supra note 5, at 61-74 (recommending a comprehensive research and writing program for law
schools).
142 Cf Elson, supra note 3, at 356-75 (arguing that this is what law professors should be
doing on the grounds that good teaching is relatively more valuable than most current
scholarship).
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explanations or justifications for the limited place of clinical training.143 The
concepts and deep assumptions of the university law school infuse and strengthen
this resistance to clinical training, and one can perceive three distinct strategies by
which the university law school instinctively has acted to limit the clinical threat.
These consist of certain dividing tactics, which keep clinical education separate
from the case method/final examination system, tactics that marginalize and
subordinate clinical programs, and tactics of infiltration by which clinics are used
to serve the purposes of the university law school.
Clinical education has been kept separate, even invisible, from the rest of
legal education as a matter of curriculum, space, and time, thereby preventing
contamination of the university law school's basic concepts and structures.
Clinical education is found mostly in the third year curriculum, and thus occurs
only after the lessons of the case method/final examination system have been
absorbed. Live-client clinics typically operate in spaces located on the periphery
of law school buildings, in basements or at greater distances from the main halls
of learning, thus keeping clinical faculty, clinic students and their learning
spatially as well as temporally separate from nonclinical faculty and students. 144
Many students also become fully engaged in clinical work as they spend more
hours working in clinics than in other courses, 145 and rather extreme time
demands are placed on clinical faculty because of their need to supervise many
students, publish as well as teach, and manage what in effect are small or
medium-size law firms.146 In effect curricular organization, spatial relationships,
and time keep nonclinical faculty and students from learning much about clinical
education, and these dividing factors diminish the possibility that clinical faculty
and students will have either the resources or incentives to educate others in the
values of supervised practical learning.
The university law school also marginalizes clinical education by tacitly
subordinating the value of clinical knowledge in subtle ways.147 Most clinics
provide services to indigent clients who are among the "low status" clients of the
profession, 148 thus signaling that clinical knowledge is inferior to or less
143 See, e.g., Pincus, supra note 80, at 422.
144 See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics ofForm, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801,926-
29 (1991); see generally Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the
Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 239 (1990).
145 See In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 546-48.
146 See id at 551-60.
14 7 See generally Feldman, supra note 123; Spiegel, supra note 16; Tushnet, supra note
131.
14 8 See generally John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client
Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (1978); Edward
0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The
Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 155 (describing how the prestige of
lawyers correlates with the social success of their clients).
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important than the doctrinal knowledge and analytical skills acquired in case
method classrooms. 149 The often distant, crowded, and utilitarian spaces within
which clinical work proceeds 150 symbolize a vulnerability, an othemess or
inferiority, especially when clinic spaces are compared to the grand or imperial
nature of the architecture within which the core curriculum is studied.151 Limited
academic credits for clinical work and different grading practices also may signal
to both students and faculty that clinical education belongs at the margins of legal
education. 152 The unwillingness of many schools to provide substantial economic
compensation, status, or security of tenure to clinical faculty also marginalizes
clinics both symbolically and materially within law school communities. 153
More insidiously, the university law school infiltrates clinical programs by
imposing its concepts and values on clinics and their participants. Both
nonclinical and clinical faculty may seek to stress "academic rigor" in the clinical
work of students, in effect insisting upon faculty-controlled rather than student-
centered learning experiences in order to emulate the rigors of the case
method/final examination system. Thus law schools often favor development of
simulated clinical courses over live client clinics because the former provide more
predictability and faculty control.154 Some schools or faculty may maintain
academic, rigor by imposing typical grading patterns on clinic work, which can
diminish incentives for close supervision or joint work between students and their
supervisors. 155 Ideas of academic rigor, grading, and close faculty supervision
may also encourage faculties to impose undue restrictions upon the less
expensive, more diverse opportunities of attomey-supervised extemships.156
Clinical faculty themselves may incorporate the university law school's ideal of
the law professor as a paragon of doctrinal expertise into their work as clinical
supervisors, thus tending to limit student opportunities for the exercise of
discretion and treat ambiguous situations as opportunities to exercise an expert's
persuasive rhetoric rather than as opportunities for learning-based inquiries with
14 9 See Tushnet, supra note 131, at 274.
150 See In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 527; Schlag, supra note 144, at 926-27;
see generally McDiarmid, supra note 144.
151 See Tushnet, supra note 131, at 273.
152 See Tarr, supra note 124, at 40.
153 See In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 536-41, 551-60; Tan, supra note 124, at
40-43.
154 See Grossman, supra note 124, at 170-72, 184-86; Tarr, supra note 124, at 35-36.
155 Cf supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing the grading of legal research and
writing courses).
156 Compare Stephen T. Maher, Clinical Legal Education in the Age of Unreason, 40
BuFF. L. REV. 809, 809-34 (1992) (arguing that clinical faculty in law schools have tended to
exclude external live client clinics for political reasons), with Tarr, supra note 124, at 38-39
(arguing that the "main disadvantage" of external clinics is "the lack of control over the quality
of the educational experience").
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students that advance the acquisition of professional knowledge.1 57 These various
infiltrations by the university law school limit or interfere with opportunities for
students and instructors to concentrate on the delicate interplay among student
performances, sympathetic but constructive feedback, collective reflections, self-
evaluations, and ultimately the acquisition of a tacit knowledge of skills, intuitions
and attitudes that constitutes the necessary basis for making sound professional
judgments.
The university law school also establishes incentives for clinic participants to
seek status under the norms of law school communities in ways that may detract
from the optimum clinical experience and discourage expansion of the clinical
influence. Clinical law faculty may become concerned that "their more intimate
relationships with students negatively influence the perceptions of students and
faculty toward clinicians" 158 or that "students who participate in the clinic are not
given the stature of law review participants by their academic community, '159
thus implicitly limiting or discounting their most effective work with others. The
university law school also creates incentives for clinical faculty to concentrate
their efforts on conventional or well-established forms of scholarship rather than
contributing to the less developed, less well-recognized literature on lawyering
and clinical teaching, because conventional scholarship is usually the safer path to
satisfy the university law school's scholarship criteria for tenure, promotions, and
salary increases. 160 These incentives cabin or limit the influence of clinical
education by keeping clinicians focused on traditional norms of the university law
school.
More generally, the university law school infiltrates the clinic conceptually.
Today, thirty years after the birth of the law school clinic, most law professors,
including clinicians, many or most law students, and perhaps many practicing
lawyers still characterize and discount clinical programs as "practical skills
education" in contrast to the "theoretical education" of the case method/final
examination law school.' 61 This is a mischaracterization, to be sure, but it is an
effective way of tacitly devaluing or subordinating clinical knowledge as inferior
157 Compare Robert J. Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the
Decade, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 604, 604-12 (1983) with Gary Bellow, On Talking Tough to Each
Other: Comments on Condlin, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619, 619-23 (1983) (agreeing with
Condlin's findings but expressing reservations about their implications) and Norman Redlich,
The Moral Value of Legal Education: A Reply, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 613, 613-18 (1983)
(questioning the extent or applicability of Condlin's findings and theory); see generally Robert
J. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice
Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1980).
158 In-House Clinic Report, supra note 5, at 554.
159 Tarr, supra note 124, at 40.
160 Cf. In-House Clinics Report, supra note 5, at 557-58 (arguing that law schools should
encourage scholarly writing about clinical methods, legal pedagogy, and legal practices).
161 See generally Spiegel, supra note 16.
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to knowledge that is treasured by the research university. The association of
clinics with vocationalism and the interests of students in using clinics to obtain
professional employment support this theory-practice distinction and helps quietly
denigrate or subordinate clinical knowledge. These distinctions tacitly limit
clinics and privilege the case method/final examination system in terms of the
basic loyalties of law professors. After all, law professors, including clinical
professors, tended to be among the best experts in the case method/final
examination setting as law students. Thus divided, marginalized, and infiltrated,
clinical education serves the traditional university law school in significant ways.
As Mark Tushnet explains, "Clinical education pacifies student demand for
practical experience and social productivity. It also eases the conscience of liberal
law professors who are uncomfortable because few of their students practice the
public interest law that those professors consider important."'162
Clinical training also helps legitimate American lawyers in two other ways:
by suggesting to regulators and the public that legal education produces sufficient
practical legal competence in new lawyers, and by providing services to indigent
clients that helps the legal profession profess its ideal of public service. Thus, as
an integral part of the university law school, the ideal conception of the clinical
movement legitimates law schools while the clinical movement in fact is limited
to avoid upsetting the case method/final examination system.
C. Professional Ethics
We' take up lawyer ethics because we have an unarticulated sense that
something is wrong, that we are drifting, and being pulled by strong currents into
dangerous waters.
-James p Elndns 163
"Legal ethics," "professional ethics," "professional responsibility," and
"professionalism" are protean terms in law schools and there are good political
reasons for this malleability. On the one hand, the organized profession, like other
professions, has historically sought to legitimate lawyers, legal services, and
statutory monopolies for lawyers by promoting ideals of public service and
professional self-regulation that assure the public and external regulators that
lawyers provide high quality ethical services.164 In pursuit of this goal the
162 Tushnet, supra note 131, at 273. On the nature of a similar "ideological work' that the
university law school provides for left law students, to help them reconcile their values with
taking jobs at large corporate law firms, see ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS:
VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 143-97 (1992).
163 James R. Elkins, Symptoms Exposed When Legalists Engage in Moral Discourse:
Reflections on the Difficulties of Talking Ethics, 17 VT. L. REV. 353,361 (1993).
164 See ABEL, supra note 57, at 142-50; Marie Haug, The Sociological Approach to Self-
Regulation, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 61, 62-63 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin
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organized bar has sought to improve "ethical training" by law schools throughout
the twentieth century and, since Watergate, this interest has intensified. 165 On the
other hand, law schools and law faculty generally have resisted the profession's
calls for ethics training. They have tended to ignore or dismiss the profession's
proposals as irrelevant or counterproductive to their business of teaching doctrine
and analytical skills, and they have raised the common if contradictory objections
that ethics training will either be ineffective, because one's ethics are acquired as
a personal matter, or constitute impermissible "indoctrination" or a violation of
"academic neutrality."'166 Within this contradiction there is a story of substantial
threats to the values of the case method law school; it is thus not surprising that
restraining devices have been imposed on ethics education similar to those placed
on writing and clinical education.
Conceived expansively, professional ethics education has at least five
dimensions, and these may be taken as an ideal conception of ethics instruction in
law schools.167 One dimension is teaching the legal doctrine of the statutes,
regulations, judicial decisions, and ethics committee opinions that regulate
lawyers' practices with regard to representing client interests, conflicts of interest,
confidential information, and the management of client properties. A second
consists of studying the practices of lawyers and regulatory bodies in managing
and responding to both the specific legal duties and aspirational aspects that
define the lawyer's "role morality." A third dimension concerns relationships
between the lawyer's role and an individual's self-concept and the ethical
dilemmas that the role morality of lawyers can impose on individual lawyers.168
The fourth concerns the sometimes substantial "ethical discretion" that lawyers
have vis-A-vis their clients when law is uncertain, open, or contested and how, in
these situations, lawyers may often need to or be invited to advise their clients
about business or personal goals and methods as well as the law. 169 The fifth
dimension to professional ethics training involves normative questions about the
legal system as whole, its rules, its adversarial practices, and its capacity or
eds., 1980).
165 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 34-41.
166 See id at 36-41, 44. For an earlier and similar discussion of law faculty fears and
dismissiveness of professional ethics, see KELLY, supra note 83, at 23-27.
167 See KELLY, supra note 83, at 29-43; Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing
the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 3. LEGAL EDUc. 75,
75-86 (1991); Rhode, supra note 5, at 38-50.
168 See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65,
65-67(1991).
169 See generally Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49
MD. L. REV. 255 (1990); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1
(1988); Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of
Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
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incapacity to provide effective services to all sectors of society. 70
The implementation of ethics training is complicated by the range of diverse
purposes and methods for teaching professional ethics and by the controversies
that surround choices among these purposes and methods. Least controversial are
the goals of making students aware of professional ethics issues and sharpening
their analytical skills for dealing with them, especially when the issues involve the
codified rules of legal ethics covered on bar examinations.171 More controversial
are the more complex goals of enhancing students' "capacity for reflective moral
judgment," providing systematic instruction in ethical reasoning, and attempting,
if indirectly, to influence the moral attitudes and conduct of lawyers.172 There is
also contention about the proper methods of instruction, which range from
providing special courses, to teaching ethics in clinics, to employing the
"pervasive method" of teaching ethics throughout the law curriculum. 173
The history of ethics training in law schools is much clearer. From the late
1890s through the 1960s, law schools made only minimal efforts to consider
ethics. They generally provided lectures by visiting judges or attorneys or a single
low-credit, ungraded course that might or might not be required and was often
taught by adjunct faculty.174 The organized bar and conferences of law school
leaders expressed concerns "lamenting the inadequacy of ethics instruction," but
it was not until Watergate implicated many lawyers in unethical and illegal
behavior that the bar and law schools took actions to reform ethics training in law
schools.175 In 1974 the ABA mandated law schools to require "instruction in the
duties and responsibilities of the legal profession."'176 States soon began to require
an examination on professional ethics for admission to the bar, and today most
states require that candidates for licensure pass a multistate multiple-choice
exdmination. 177 As a result, virtually all law schools offer a required course in
ethics, usually for two credits, and this course concentrates on preparing students
to pass the bar exam. This course generally is perceived as ineffective instruction,
is treated as an unattractive teaching assignment by faculty, and is often if not
always staffed "by a reluctant, rotating cadre of junior faculty and outside
170 See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 83, at 35-37; Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 167, at
86.
171 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 5, at 42-43; Simon, supra note 168, at 65-67.
172 See Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 167, at 84-85; Rhode, supra note 5, at 42-43.
173 See Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 167, at 86-97; see also Rhode, supra note 5, at
38-50 (recommending that both special courses and a modified pervasive method be used as
necessary elements in a "continuing method" of law school instruction in ethics).
174 See KELLY, supra note 83, at 5-21; Rhode, supra note 5, at 35-36.
175 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 36-39.
176 ABA, STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS,
Standard 302(a)(iii) (1974).
177 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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lecturers." 178 The resistance of the university law school to ethics training
remains intact.
The recent interest in professional ethics training has, however, engaged
some full-time faculty in both teaching and scholarship within the field, and this
work is producing new insights into lawyers' ethics and possible reforms to ethics
instruction in law schools. 179 This scholarship has focused on the nature of
relationships between lawyers and clients and the "ethical discretion' that lawyers
may exercise in advising clients about appropriate goals and methods for acting
under legal uncertainty.180 It also has focused on ways in which legal educators
provide tacit instruction in a certain kind of amoral ethical behavior and on
reasons why law schools ought to provide more comprehensive instruction in
ethics and professional ethics throughout the curriculum.18 1
Taking ethics seriously could constitute a substantial threat to the case
method/final examination law school. For example, providing sustained
instruction in the major traditions of ethical thought could have percolating effects
throughout the curriculum, adding a pervasive moral analysis that would tend to
disrupt the flow of rule-oriented case method discourse that pertains to final
examinations in doctrinal subjects. Raising pervasive questions about lawyers'
ethics could threaten the law school's tacit conception of the good lawyer as an
amoral, client-bound technician who employs an objectivis, discussion-closing
rhetoric and dominating style. Raising pervasive questions about lawyers' ethics
would also question how law professors and legal education tacitly model or
instruct their students in ethical behavior 182 Such changes and questions would
also constitute a serious challenge to the ideal of the case method professor as an
impersonal, authoritative, critical, rule-oriented judge, or charismatic, tough-
minded advocate who makes authoritative statements about legal doctrine while
neutrally analyzing the performances of students.
The university law school has divided, splintered, marginalized, and
infiltrated ethics education in much the way it has treated law school writing and
clinics. The multi-faceted nature of legal ethics and its various teaching methods
have made ethics training a relatively easy target. Faculty indifference or
unwillingness to appreciate the importance of ethical questions in law and legal
practices or how law teaching tacitly instructs students in amoral advocacy can be
explained by the tacit power and attractiveness of a rle-oriented case method for
many law professors. The case method analysis of judicial opinions has worked
178 Id. at 39-41.
179 See id. at44.
180 See generally, e.g., WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998); Gordon, supra
note 169; Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589
(1985); Sarat, supra note 169; Simon, supra note 169.
181 See generally, e.g., Elkins, supra note 163; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law
Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1991); Rhode, supra note 5.
182 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 181, at 6-7.
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well for them, and they understandably may have difficulty conceiving legal
education as anything but the case method's rough amalgam of a skeptical,
flexible positivism of rules and ad hoc policy arguments.1 83 In this perspective,
ethical questions and any systematic ethical analysis of the law or the lawyers'
behavior will seem incidental, marginal, or even invisible to the case method/final
examination law professor.
The apparent indifference of most law students to ethics training184 also has
causes that seem rooted in basic assumptions of the university law school. Within
the case method/final examination system, law students leam tacitly to perceive
of law as mostly rules, a lesson that helps prepare them to take law school
examinations and bar examinations.185 This lesson presumably encourages
students to focus on ethics instruction merely as preparation for their bar
examination and helps explain their indifference to instruction on the broader,
more complex and less certain issues of professional ethics. Thus the case
method/final examination law school generates student interests that match
faculty interests in limiting ethics training to a study of the codified rules of legal
ethics.
The university law school discourages consideration of ethical issues in a
more pervasive way too. The "rigor" and "impersonality" of case method
classrooms and fierce competitiveness of the law school's
examination/grading/class ranking system tacitly teach the division and separation
of human agents from each other and the limitations of relationships between
human agents to formal, impersonal, hierarchical terms. Effective deliberation
about ethics, however, requires a more open, more egalitarian, risk-taking and
relatively unbounded discourse between persons, and this sort of deliberation puts
one's self at risk in relating to others.186 The case method/final examination law
school fails to provide a supportive context for this kind of deliberation and
reflection upon ethical issues in lawyering and the law.
Thus cabined in an upper class course of low status, ethics instruction
incorporates the case method/final examination system and serves the interests of
the university law school. The single course is typically oriented towards teaching
doctrinal rules as a matter of both design and student interest, and ethics is kept
183 Cf Brest, supra note 14, at 1945-46 (describing "legal process" as "an amalgam of
policy-oriented doctrinalism" and "the tacit core of most law teaching and scholarship today").
184 See, e.g., Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 167, at 88-92, 95-96; Rhode, supra note
5, at 40; see generally Ronald Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A
Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247. Clinical instruction in professional
ethics maybe an exception to this point about student indifference, since law students are often
enthusiastic about their experiential learning in clinics. However, the elective nature, relative
costs and other objectives and needs of clinics undoubtedly limit their practical effectiveness in
providing ethics instruction.
185 See Kissam, supra note 15, at 461-74.
186 See generally Elkins, supra note 163.
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separate from the rest of the curriculum. The focus on doctrinal rules avoids the
more complicated, less certain, more creative and more embarrassing ethical
questions that occur in legal practices, helping preserve the unclouded rationalism
of the case method.187 The separate course on ethics as well as the new ethics
scholarship-as long as this scholarship does not disturb the university law
school's basic structures-also contribute to legitimating lawyers and their
services as ethical, and thus high quality. The university law school thus
implicitly incorporates professional ethics to serve its purposes by helping to
maintain good relationships between law schools and the organized bar and the
public.
IV. WHY NoT A QUASI-CLINICAL LAW SCHOOL?
There is, then, a sense of chaos in legal pedagogy. Contemporary law schools
employ an archaic nineteenth century methodology and maintain both explicit
and tacit boundaries around the new forms of instruction that promise more
effective and more democratic education. The archaic case method/final
examination methodology serves important interests, to be sure. This system
teaches minimally necessary skills and knowledge, allows for a relatively easy
sorting of students into class ranks that provide both screening and credentials for
legal employers, and provides law professors with much time to engage in
scholarship and consulting. But what if the basic principles of the professional
reforms could be effectively translated for use in mainstream courses, and
implemented throughout the curriculum at little or no cost to the interests served
by the case method/final examination system? If this could be done, the
professional reforms would constitute not merely supplements, but the basis for
developing a sound comprehensive form of legal education for the twenty-first
century.
This Part outlines a way by which the principles of the three professional
reforms could be implemented in mainstream teaching effectively and
economically. It argues that relying upon the principle of learning by writing
would be a good means to implement the basic principles of the professional
reforms throughout the law school curriculum. Reasons why writing should be
pursued by law schools more thoroughly are described first. Several ways in
which writing exercises might be inserted into substantive courses to help law
students acquire tacit professional knowledge, engage in ethical reflection, begin
to make practical judgments, and improve their reading and writing habits and
skills in general are then sketched out. Finally, the likely objections that will be
made to the proliferation of writing in law schools are considered.
The basic principles of the professional reforms might be pursued by other
strategies. For example, John Elson has argued that mainstream law teaching
187 See generally Simon, supra note 168.
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should adopt a pervasive use of "the problem method" to teach clinical or
preclinical skills.188 Or, following the University of Seattle, "mini-clinics" might
be developed to supplement major doctrinal courses.1 89 With relatively unlimited
resources, these alternatives might very well be superior to the writing-across-the-
curriculum approach. The basic claims for writing reform, however, are that
writing exercises would not be inconsistent with these more elaborate reforms and
that the principle of learning by writing fits easily with traditional law teaching
and thus promises to be an economical way to reform the case method/final
examination law school.
A. The Needfor Writing-Across-the-Curriculum
There are several reasons why law schools should provide additional
opportunities for students to write law in ways other than final examinations.
First, lawyers consider writing in general to be a very important practice skill, and
they believe that law schools could do more than they currently do to enhance the
writing abilities of their graduates. In a recent survey, new lawyers in Chicago
and in rural and midsize-urban Missouri ranked "written communication" as the
second most important legal skill, just behind "oral communication" and ahead of
"ability in legal analysis and legal reasoning," "knowledge of substantive law,"
and "knowledge of procedural law"--in other words, ahead of the knowledge and
skills promoted by the case method/final examination system.190 These lawyers
also ranked "drafting legal documents" just behind legal analysis and reasoning
and ahead of the knowledge of substantive and procedural law.191 Both groups
also believed that skills of written communication and legal drafting can be taught
effectively in law schools and that current schools are doing but a fair to poor job
of such teaching.192 Thus, one general but basic reason why more writing should
be incorporated into the law school curriculum is that consumers want this
service.
Another important reason, simply put, is that writing enhances or develops
188 Elson, supra note 23, at 383-87 (proposing a pervasive use of the "problem method"
in substantive courses to teach professional skills); cf. Frank, supra note 72, at 914-23
(outlining sixteen propositions for a "clinical lawyer-school'); Rideout & Rarnsfield, supra note
5, at 74-91 (recommending a comprehensive research and writing program for law schools).
189 See John B. Mitchell et al., And Then Suddenly Seattle University Was On Its Way to a
Parallel, Integrative Curriculum, 2 CLINICALL. REV. 1, 11-18 (1995) (describing the invention
of one-credit live-client and simulated course components running parallel to related upper class
substantive courses). Similarly, Syracuse College of Law has initiated 5 limited enrollment
"applied learning courses" that attempt to integrate clinical skills with the study of advanced
legal doctrine. Interview with Sarah Ramsay, Professor of Law, Syracuse College of Law, in
Lawrence, Kan. (Feb. 16, 1999).
190 Garth & Martin, supra note 51, at 473.
191 Id. at 473, 477.
192 See id. at 479, 481.
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legal thought. Writing law in nonexamination situations can provide manifold
opportunities for feedback to a writer about her ideas, and this kind of writing,
when it becomes habitual, is an excellent way to improve a law student's grasp
and use of doctrinal knowledge and analytical skills. 193 Further, since much
useful feedback on writing can be provided quickly by faculty readers,
194
teaching assistants,195 peer readers and, significantly, by the basic process of
critically reading one's own writings, 196 much nonexamination writing about law
could be added to the law school curriculum at quite modest costs. There are thus
some very good pedagogical reasons for trying to satisfy the consumer demand
that law schools provide more writing opportunities.
The more specific argument for expanding writing throughout the curriculum
is that it would be a good way to implement the concepts of the professional
reforms in mainstream teaching. Consider these concepts and how writing
exercises could implement them in productive ways. Both clinics and professional
ethics courses are designed to encourage ethical reflection, and writing short
exercises on ethical issues in particular substantive fields would force students to
contemplate and reflect with some intensity upon the nature of concrete ethical
dilemmas faced by legal practitioners. Legal writing courses and clinics as well as
mainstream courses are designed in part to teach the rhetorical judgments
involved in making persuasive presentations to different kinds of audiences.
Diverse writing exercises in different doctrinal courses would be an effective way
to introduce students to writing for diverse audiences such as clients, other
lawyers, judges, and administrative officials, and thus mitigate the habits that are
formed by writing only for law professors on final examinations. 197 Clinics
especially, but ethics and legal writing courses too, attempt to introduce law
students to the process of making sound practical judgments in diffuse, complex,
and variable contexts. Writing about diverse legal subjects would begin to engage
law students in making many different kinds of practical judgments simply
because the writing process itself involves deliberating on and choosing among
alternatives by balancing their pros and cons within complex contextual
backgrounds. More specifically, writing assignments can require students to
practice making practical legal judgments such as choosing which legal
193 See generally, e.g., Feinman & Feldman, supra note 8; Greenshaw, supra note 7;
Gross, supra note 7; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5.
194 For example, such useful feedback on writing can be provided by commenting on
brief outlines or short prospectuses for papers or memorandums. See Kissam, supra note 11, at
240 (discussing comments on three page prospectuses).
195 See generally Feinman, supra note 116; Leon Trakman, Law Student Teachers: An
Untapped Resource, 30 J. LEGAL EDUc. 331 (1979).
196See Kissam, supra note 12, at 140-41. Critical student reading of their own written
texts can often be enhanced, of course, by providing general oral feedback in classrooms as
students review what they have written in accordance with a faculty member's ideas.
197 See generally Greenshav, supra note 7; Kissam, supra note 15; Parker, supra note 7.
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arguments to present to a decisionmaker or what decision to make when
confronted with competing arguments. 198 All three professional reforms promote
and depend upon the acquisition of many kinds of tacit knowledge that infuse
legal practice, especially ethical reflection and making good rhetorical or practical
judgments. Writing about diverse and complicated legal problems and obtaining
constructive feedback in various ways is surely a good way for students to begin
to sense and to acquire the diffuse unspeakable aspects of professional tacit
knowledge. This knowledge is acquired only gradually, by trial-and-error, much
like one must learn the right and wrong ways to hit good tennis shots or play the
piano through frequent supervised practices. Writing many short exercises on
diverse issues with quick feedback, provided by more experienced readers, would
appear to be an effective and relatively low cost method of providing this
instruction.
A fourth reason to expand writing throughout the curriculum is that this could
do much to mitigate the poor reading and writing habits that seem to be inculcated
in many law students (and perhaps many professors too) by their steady diet of
writing (and reading) examination essays. Law students may enter law schools as
relatively skillful readers and writers notwithstanding the perverse incentives and
limited opportunities provided by the education of undergraduates in the
contemporary research university. But the incentives and pressures to do well on
classic issue-spotting, time pressured final examinations, in which "the rules of
law" must be quickly recalled to spot issues and argue for their resolution, seem
to inscribe in many students instrumentalist forms of reading and writing: that is,
reading cases and treatises "merely to obtain the rules" 199 and writing by means
of a "paradigm of good paragraph thinking/writing," which generates many
examination answers quickly but is often less successful in other forms of
writing.200 In any event, whatever the causes, there is substantial concern in the
legal academy today about the critical reading skills as well as writing skills of
law students. 01 It may be that the best or even only way to inspire more critical
and more imaginative reading by law students is to require writing projects that
can be accomplished only if the writer must first delve deeply, imaginatively, and
critically into complicated texts that have been written by others.202 Writings of
198 See Kissam, supra note 11, at 239 (describing the use of "limited research, analytical
papers" in a constitutional law survey course in which students are required to develop "the best
possible constitutional arguments" on two sides of a difficult issue and then advance "a
reasoned judgment" to resolve their issue).
199 See, e.g., Fajans & Falk, supra note 12, 163-70.
200 See generally Kissam, supra note 15; cf Steven Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1389, 1389-93 (1984).
201 For example, in January, 1999, a day-long workshop on "critical reading" in law
schools was conducted as part of the annual meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools.
202 See Ann Berthoff, LA. Richards, in TRADmoNS OF INQUIRY 50, 52 (J. Brereton ed.
2008 [Vol. 60:1965
PROFESSIONAL REFORMS OFLA WSCHOOL
diverse kinds should also help students develop their writing skills even if they
receive only limited instruction and feedback.
Finally, more writing would make legal education more democratic as well as
more effective. Most fundamentally, writing practices by comparison to case
method/final examination practices tend as a matter of structure to provide more
equal attention to individual students in terms of supervision and feedback since
faculty members, teaching assistants, or student peers who comment on student
writings will be responding to and commenting on each student's writing.
Contrast this with the variable and limited feedback that is provided to law
student comments in the case method classroom, in which law professors in the
interest of controlling the conversation do most of the talking and may commonly
interrupt as much as they reply to student statements,203 and the even more
limited feedback of a single grade on a final examination. In addition, law
students have diverse learning styles, backgrounds, perspectives, interests, and
talents, and the case method/final examination practices barely recognize this
diversity. Instead, they tend to impose a fundamentally homogenous analytical,
rapid-response, nondeliberative method upon everyone. More writing exercises,
with their various kinds of feedback loops and extra time for deliberation,
reflections, and revisioning, would provide more choices to students about how
they acquire and apply legal knowledge. Thus, this method should nurture
different learning styles and different legal interests in a much richer fashion than
the case method/final examination system does.
B. Implementing Writing-Across-the-Curriculum
The critical task remains to persuade mainstream law professors that writing
exercises can be employed throughout the curriculum at relatively little cost. In an
attempt to do this, this Article describes some exemplary ways of incorporating
learning by writing into basic doctrinal courses. These examples are taken from
literature and personal experience teaching basic courses in criminal procedure
and constitutional law. None of these methods can be guaranteed effective or
mistake-free, of course, but they would appear to constitute a useful starting place
for experimenting with the principle of learning by writing in the core curriculum.
Writing exercises can be used to enhance learning the doctrinal knowledge
and analytical skills taught by the case method/final examination system. One
direct way is simply to require students periodically to outline or write out
1985) ( Indeed, the old formula-students can only write as well as they can read-may be
reversed as teachers come to understand what it means to say that writing is a mode of learning:
students can read only as well as they can write.) (emphasis in the original).
203 See Elizabeth Mertz, Linguistic Ideology and Praxis in U.S. Law School Classrooms,
in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES: PRACtiCE AND THEORY 149, 153-59 (Bambi B. Schiefflin et al.
eds., 1998).
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ungraded answers to "practice exam questions." 204 These answers can be
reviewed in many different ways depending upon available resources and a
professor's confidence in delegating a limited kind of teaching authority to others.
The professor can simply describe "model answers" during class time, allowing
students the opportunity to provide the direct feedback to their own work, or the
feedback process may be enhanced by asking students to mark or comment on
each other's answers. This latter process can be substantially enriched at relatively
low cost to the law school's budget and the professor's time by hiring upper class
law students as "teaching assistants" who read, hypothetically grade, and
comment on written student answers.205 This process saves classroom time by
comparison to other feedback methods, provides substantial individualized
feedback to students, and can engage some very committed upper class students
(who often may have had prior teaching experience) as effective tutors of
beginning students in large classes. The latter advantage seems especially
significant because many students in large classes often seem more willing to
approach teaching assistants than professors to obtain feedback or simply to ask
(their self-defined) "stupid questions."206 Most importantly, whatever the
feedback, this kind of writing gives students many opportunities to improve their
legal knowledge from the simple fact of having to write, and then read and reflect
upon, their answers-especially since practice exam questions need not always be
answered under the same time pressure as final examinations.
Another basic writing method to improve the learning of legal doctrine and
legal analysis is the use of "take-home examinations" that may be written over a
longer period of time (say eight hours, two or three days, a week, or an
examination period) than the typical final examination.207 This process provides
the same concrete feedback from text to writer that practice exam writing does,
and this feedback is likely to be even more intense and more useful to learning
because writing take-home examinations counts for grades. Essay answers written
on a take-home basis are also likely to be better organized and more clearly
written than essays written under time pressures, and one can usually require take-
home answers to be typed. Thus readers of take-home examinations are more
2 04 Cf Feinman & Feldman, supra note 8, at 534-44 (providing repetitive examinations to
a first year course that integrated contracts, torts, and legal writing).
205 1 experimented with this approach one summer teaching an intensive five-week course
in pretrial criminal procedure law to first year students. Over the second, third, and fourth
weekends of the course, sixty-one students were required to write an answer to a practice exam
question, which was then reviewed and returned to the students prior to their next exercise by
two upper class law students working as teaching assistants. The results in terms of generally
sound final examination answers seemed significant to me, and the first year students were
quite ecstatic about the help they had received from the teaching assistants.
20 6 On the pedagogical advantages of using upper class law students as teaching assistants,
see Trakman, supra note 195, at 338-41.
20 7 On the value of take-home examinations, see Kissam, supra note 12, at 158-63.
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likely to develop a generally favorable assessment of their students' potential as
practicing lawyers, and this development might well enhance legal education by
altering the rather negative view of students' general legal potential that so many
law professors appear to acquire from reading final examination essays.2 08
A legitimate concern about take-home examinations is the possibility they
offer for cheating, and another concern may be with their failure to provide the
best possible practice for time-limited bar examinations. The possibilities for
cheating can be dealt with, if a school's honor code is insufficient, by requiring
in-class writing samples (for example, by collecting practice exam answers) that
can be compared to suspect take-home answers, and by tailoring examination
questions to classroom discussions in order to reduce the possibility of outsiders
writing answers. With regard to the bar examination concern, one can provide bar
examination practice in doctrinal subjects by adding one or two mid-term time-
limited multiple choice examinations that either are graded or must be completed
"satisfactorily."
Other kinds of writing exercises, including less formal ones, may be tailored
to many aspects of legal subjects, including issues and practices not easily
covered by final examinations. Quite simply, students may be asked periodically
to write out or outline questions, statements, or answers that relate to a course's
assigned readings, and then parts of class discussion can be based on the ideas
articulated by these writings. Some of these writings can be done prior to class
and others written in class, and based on personal experience, class discussions
conducted upon these kinds of writings are typically much richer than ordinary
class discussions and, in any event, these discussions are oriented towards the
students' understandings of the subject rather than the professor's.209 To be sure,
the feedback to these written texts will be less systematic and less substantial than
the feedback of prior methods, but the benefits gained will include some focused
writing on the law by students and class discussions that are thoughtful and
effectively pitched at the students' levels of understanding.
One may also supplement final examinations with more formal writing
assignments if a professor has the resources for providing supervision, feedback,
and grading, and if the students have tolerance for additional assignments. These
projects may involve drafting contractual, legislative, or litigation documents and
writing memorandums or papers, even short ones, on critical ancillary topics such
as ethics issues in the field. The major problem with this method, of course, is
limited resources (of both professors and students). But a surprising amount of
substantial, though brief, supervision and feedback can be provided by reviewing
208 On the dismal view of students' potential that law professors seem to take away from
reading examination answers, see Feinman & Feldman, supra note 60, at 879-82; Janet
Motley, A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NOvA L. REV. 723,723-24 (1986).
On what this dismal or corrosive view may do to the character or personality of law professors,
see Kissam, supra note 15, at 483-85.
209 See Kissam, supra note 12, at 157.
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one-page outlines of writing projects, and these exercises need not be graded on
the same complex grading curve applied to final exams. Upper class teaching
assistants might be employed to review these assignments as another means of
mitigating the resource problem. Surely this approach promises substantial
benefits in terms of the effectiveness and diversity of legal training. 210 It could in
the end convert many traditional courses into "pre-clinical" or "quasi-clinical"
courses that help students integrate "theory" with "practice" and acquire rich
experience in making practical judgments, employing tacit professional
knowledge, and learning from a process of continual feedback and supervision. 211
A more radical approach to implementing writing-across-the-curriculum
would be to abandon final examinations in some subjects and substitute
substantial writing projects. For example, in a required survey course in
constitutional law (with sixty to one hundred students), the author now requires
each student to write a "limited research, analytical paper" in lieu of a final
examination. 212 This project asks each student to choose a topic from a list of
approved topics which all involve evaluating two alternative rules of
constitutional law or other constitutional premises such as competing theories of
interpretation or competing theories of the substantive purpose of particular
doctrines. Each student is required to develop "the best possible constitutional
arguments" for two alternative premises, and then to advance a "reasoned
judgment" for choosing one of the premises over the other. After two months of
the semester has passed, each student must submit a three-page prospectus that
outlines their topic and indicates their research efforts to date. Comments are
quickly given on these ungraded prospectuses, and a ten page paper is due during
the final examination period. Opportunities to read and comment on one-page
"structural outlines" of any student's project after the prospectus has been
submitted are also offered. In effect, this project is much like a constrained take-
home examination, except that: (1) students have considerable discretion to
choose a subject for their investigation; (2) the professor has opportunities to
provide collaborative supervision and feedback that influence the final
development of the projects; and (3) as the ultimate reader, the professor has the
delightful task of reading many different constitutional analyses rather than one
2 10 See Bean, supra note 10, at 277-78 (discussing supplemental drafting assignments in
property and family law courses); see generally, e.g., Robert Batey, Literature in a Criminal
Law Course: Aeschylus, Burgess, Oates, Camus, Poe, and Melville, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 45
(1998) (using supplemental papers in a criminal law course).
211 Cf Mitchell et al., supra note 189, at 11-18 (describing one-credit live-client and
simulated clinical components ofmainstrearn doctrinal courses).
2 12 See Kissam, supra note 11, at 239. In order to ensure that students also focus on the
basic rules of constitutional law and obtain relevant experience or practice for the bar
examination, at times I have required a multiple choice "black letter law" examination that
counted for a fraction of the grade. Currently I require only "satisfactory completion" of two
mid-term multiple choice "practice exercises" as a better way to ensure coverage of bar
examination issues without imposing excessive time demands on my students.
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hundred or so answers to the same examination questions. As the final step in this
process, a brief note of one page or less is sent to the students evaluating their
paper and explaining their grade.
After a decade of experience, this project seems well designed to accomplish
educational goals that extend far beyond what can be expected from any case
method/final examination course and, importantly, this project takes little if any
more of the professor's time than would be devoted to reading an equivalent
number of essay examinations. It seems clear that most students experience the
rhetorical process of putting together complex constitutional arguments and the
judgmental process of making decisions in hard cases with considerable intensity
and even enjoyment, which suggests that this kind of project advances some
broad goals of clinical training and perhaps ethics training as well. Second,
students obtain a good experience in complicated constitutional research, which
reinforces their learning from the first-year research and writing course. Third,
and most significantly, students are encouraged to read an ensemble of
heterogeneous and complex constitutional materials with some care and some
degree of criticism as they explore case law, law review articles, and
constitutional treatises, if not other theoretical writings that are also relevant to
their work. Thus a central concept of learning by writing--experiencing the
ongoing feedback or collaboration between critical reading and critical writing-
appears to have become a very substantial part of this writing project. Finally,
there are the benefits of the joy of working with some intelligent, hard working
persons to help them put together complex projects.
Of course, the idea of a limited research, analytical paper may not be adapted
easily for other subjects or even for different approaches to teaching constitutional
law. But in doctrinal subjects in which theory of some kind is important, or in
which putting together arguments based on complex precedents and policy is
important, or in which ethical considerations must or should be faced, this sort of
project would seem to constitute a basis for experimenting with replacing final
examinations by learning through writing.
C. Objections to Writing-Across-the-Curriculum
Several objections to writing-across-the-curriculum can be expected. Some of
these can be answered with relative ease, but others point to more complicated
trade-offs and ethical decisions by individual professors who teach in the basic
curriculum. This section begins with objections that are relatively easy to answer
and then considers the more difficult ones.
First, students may not obtain sufficient experience with comprehensive time-
limited final examinations to prepare for passing their bar examinations. This is a
weak objection for three reasons. Most writing projects will supplement rather
than replace final examinations, and indeed many of these projects should
improve a student's skills at taking final examinations and the bar examination.
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Also, if substantial writing projects are substituted for final examinations, mid-
term multiple choice examinations or other exercises can be provided to help
students prepare for bar examinations.2 13 Further, probably the best sort of
preparation for bar examinations that law students obtain is a general practice in
organizing and applying complex legal rules under time constraints, and there is
no evidence that substituting writing projects for final examinations in some
doctrinal courses would diminish greatly the quality of this learning.
Second, writing-across-the-curriculum projects will detract from the case
method as a matter of time or student focus and attention. This could be an effect
although many of the writing projects suggested would probably enhance rather
than detract from the case method. In any event, this objection seems wedded to a
"rational myth" that the law school's case method is so good that it must be
employed in a relatively exclusive manner even though empirical evidence that
the method is a superior way to teach doctrinal knowledge and analytical skills is
lacking.214 Such rational myths do not ensure effective learning, of course, for
they only assume a rational form that promises learning in a sea of uncertainty.215
Furthermore, the case method was invented to help establish law schools wvithin
the research university of the nineteenth century that demanded "theory,"
"science," and "reason."216 With the contemporary research university less
demanding on this score, and the legal profession less centered upon litigation, we
should no longer remain in thrall to the myth of the case method.
Third, a more difficult objection to assess is that writing-across-the-
curriculum projects would require additional professorial time for teaching and
thus take away a valuable resource from the scholarship and consulting services
provided by law professors. One response to this is that many student writing
projects could be substituted for other kinds of teaching time, and thus writing
projects need not take substantial time from scholarship or consulting. For
example, in a "quasi-clinical" law school, fewer class hours would be devoted to
case method analysis in doctrinal courses and class hours might be reduced to
permit more professorial attention to providing feedback on writing projects-
through in-class comments, individual conferences, and brief written comments
on a student's writing or outlines for a writing project2 17 Also, upper class
213 See id.
214 See generally Bryden, supra note 2; Paul Teich, Research on American Law
Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1986).
215 On how "rational myths" that relate educational means to educational ends in a
rational form pervade the educational process due to our fundamental uncertainties about
teaching and learning, see generally JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD ScoTr, ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVmONMENTS: RrrUAL AND RATIONALrIY (1983); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan,
Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. Soc. 340
(1977).
216 See supra Part H.
217 Brief comments on writing projects are likely to be more effective than longer
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students could be employed as teaching assistants as another means of limiting
the commitment of professorial time to student writing.218 To be sure, an
objection may be raised by both professors and students that teaching assistants
are not as expert as professors, but the insistence that law professors be the only
teachers or authoritative spokespersons about good writing and good legal
thought is surely another "rational myth" of legal education, especially when law
students are left to learn so much on their own from commercial outlines, student
grapevines, and teaching assistants in research and writing courses.219 A second
response to the argument about additional professorial time, of course, could be
that much professorial time currently committed to scholarship and consulting is
not as socially valuable as we commonly think and that law professors should be
committing more time to effective teaching.2 20
The most difficult objection may be that the introduction of substantial
writing into basic courses would make imposition of the law school's grading
curve more difficult. This could result from two separate causes. First, if students
are afforded opportunities to practice writing examination essays and given
effective feedback on this practice, they may be quite likely to perform more
effectively on final examinations. This could cause differences between student
performances to narrow, making it more difficult to distinguish between
performances for grading purposes.221 In any event, improved examination
performances by all students would at least make it more difficult psychologically
for professors to impose the many low grades that are demanded by law school
grading curves. Second, if substantial writing projects are substituted for
examinations, the grading of this writing is likely to require more holistic grading
methods, like the grading of clinical work and seminar papers, which are less
capable of generating the many fine distinctions that a law school grading curve
demands.222 Furthermore, imposing a mandatory grading curve on writing
projects may pose new psychological difficulties in that law students, while they
eventually seem to acquiesce in low grades on examinations, are used to receiving
only top grades on writing projects as a matter of their undergraduate experience.
Thus obtaining lower grades for law school writing projects may cause special
discontents.
Yet, while law school grading curves may raise psychological problems and
comments because they can focus students' attention and dramatize the need for major
revisions. We law professors unfortunately tend to emphasize length rather than brevity in our
comments on student writing, perhaps because of our needs to demonstrate expertise or defend
the relatively low grades that are demanded by law school grading curves.
218 See generally Feinman, supra note 116; Trakman, supra note 195.
219 See Kissar, supra note 12, at 165--66.
220 On this kind of response, see generally Elson, supra note 3; Schiltz, supra note 50.
221 See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 8, at 545-51; Kissam, supra note 15, at 495-96.
222 See Kissan supra note 15, at 444-49.
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have harmful educational effects when imposed on writing projects,2 23 grading
curves are desired by law firms to help screen and hire new lawyers and this
grading methodology is likely to be a feature of legal education for a long time to
come.224 Thus law professors must be ethically concerned about applying their
school's grading curve fairly between different classes and among students in
their own courses. The temptation to stay with the traditional case method/final
examination system may seem quite strong. Individual professors who wish to
employ substantial writing projects in basic doctrinal courses may, it appears,
have to struggle a bit to provide more effective education while administering a
fair grading system within the parameters of grading curves. There are good
reasons to undertake the struggle, as this Article suggests. But until a critical mass
of law professors begins to teach by writing, the struggle to balance one's grading
responsibilities with pedagogical responsibilities may be somewhat difficult at
times.
This is not to say we should abandon this struggle or any other difficulties
with teaching by writing. Rather we should continue to experiment with writing
throughout the curriculum, for we owe this to our students if not also the legal
profession and American society.2 25
223 See supra text accompanying note 114.
224 See generally Downs & Levit, supra note 58.
225 Cf Paul Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE LJ. 444, 448
(1970) Savoy states the following:
If any real leaming is to go on in our schools... then our first responsibility must be
to the human beings who live in our academic house, not to the Bar, or the profession, or
the alumni. That means that much of our academic planning must involve not the shaping
of something called the "curriculum" but the removal of blocks and resistances within the
educational organism so that students are free to achieve their own levels of integration.
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